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Introduction 
North Korea’s human rights issues are not as well known among the 
world population as they should be, but the trend is moving towards greater 
awareness.  The human rights issues tend to be subsumed under the security 
issues.  Both by themselves are very important, and together, they constitute 
the most serious pair of crises in the world.  Usually, they have been 
addressed separately.  However, addressing both together increases the 
possibilities of resolving either one—not unlike the Helsinki Process 
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publication possible.  Alex Yorko also contributed notably.  My sincere thanks to Jens 
David Ohlin, my interlocutor at the Symposium, who kindly gave me his book DEFENDING 
HUMANITY: WHEN FORCE IS JUSTIFIED AND WHY (2008), which I found remarkably 
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regarding the former Soviet Union. 
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) government’s 
abuse of its own people truly qualifies as egregious.  Without any hyperbole 
necessary, mere analysis of these violations bears many similarities with the 
way Hitler treated the German concentration camp population between the 
1930s and 40s,1 Mao’s concentration camps in China, Pol Pot’s reign of terror 
in Cambodia, and Stalin’s gulags in the former Soviet Union.2  Beyond all of 
these examples, the North Korean government has engaged in gross, 
systematic violations by punishing through guilt by association three 
generations of its own populace.3  So grandchildren find themselves punished 
for their hereditary relationship with a grandparent deemed an enemy of the 
state. 
These concentration camps, as shockingly draconian as those of Mao, 
Hitler, Pol, and Stalin, perpetrate a panoply of brutality.  The DPRK 
government both neglects and abuses its own people in one large jail of a 
country, while using its concentration camps particularly for those considered 
even slightly disloyal to the regime.  Current approximations place the 
concentration camp population at around 80,000 to 120,000 people, with 
multiple hundreds of thousands (as a low estimate) murdered within its 
unspeakably cruel confines.4 
The government abysmally fails to fulfill the rights of the North Korean 
people.  Whether civil, political, economic, social, or cultural, the people of 
the DPRK remain horribly oppressed.5  Yet the gross, systematic abuse of 
their human rights has turned terribly banal and commonly corrupt.6  The 
 
 1. Agence France Presse, North Korean Prison Camps Are “Like Hitler’s 
Auschwitz”, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/survivors-
liken-north-korean-prison-camps-to-holocaust-2013-2 [https://perma.cc/HM4P-VGDX]. 
 2. Victor Cha, The Gulags of North Korea, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 10, 2014, 6:58 
PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/10/the-gulags-of-north-korea/ 
[https://perma.cc/WK4W-ML4J]; Jared Sichel, Holocaust in North Korea, JEWISH J. (Jan. 
23, 2014), http://jewishjournal.com/cover_story/126291/ [https://perma.cc/X44Y-BYT6]. 
 3. Jeremy Laurence & Ju-min Park, Guilty-by-Association: Growing Up in Hell of 
North Korean Gulag, REUTERS (May 4, 2011, 3:36 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-prisons/guilty-by-association-growing-up-
in-hell-of-north-korean-gulag-idUSTRE74275D20110504 [https://perma.cc/3LG8-
7ULW]; see North Korea: Events of 2015, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/north-korea 
[https://perma.cc/TP52-RB3M]. 
 4. David Usborne, A Land of ‘Unspeakable Atrocities’: UN Commission Warns 
North Korean Leader Kim Jong-Un He Could Face Trial for Human Rights Abuses, 
INDEPENDENT (Feb. 17, 2014, 4:25 PM), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/a-land-of-unspeakable-atrocities-un-
commission-warns-leader-kim-jong-un-he-could-face-trial-for-9134405.html 
[https://perma.cc/TH42-5Y3E]; see also VICTOR CHA, THE IMPOSSIBLE STATE: NORTH 
KOREA, PAST AND FUTURE 172 (2013). 
 5. See Why North Korea?, LIBERTY N. KOR., 
https://www.libertyinnorthkorea.org/why-north-korea/ [https://perma.cc/N89X-JYS9]. 
 6. See North Korea 2016/2017, AMNESTY INT’L, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/north-korea/report-korea-
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regime acts lawlessly, as if domestic and international law do not exist—like 
a criminal syndicate rather than a legitimate government. 
North Korea also commits genocide, a jus cogens offence,7 against 
Christians and all who are not completely of Korean descent.8  For example, 
the government murders or forces the abortion of mixed-race, Half-Chinese 
infants.9 
 Brief Background 
There have been several precursor organizations to the United Nations 
since as early as the middle of the 1800s.  The International 
Telecommunication Union was founded in 1865 as the International 
Telegraph Union, and the Universal Postal Union was established in 1874.10  
Both are now United Nations specialized agencies, among the UN’s over 300 
sub-organizations.11  In 1899, the International Peace Conference was held 
for discussions on how to peacefully settle crises around the world, how to 
prevent wars and codify rules of warfare.12  These discussions established the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, which began work in 1902.13  The League of 
Nations was the forerunner of the United Nations.14  This organization was 
created in 1919 under the Treaty of Versailles to promote international 
cooperation and to achieve peace and security.15  The League of Nations 
ceased its activities after failing to prevent the Second World War.16 
The United Nations (UN) was established on January 1, 1942, during the 
Second World War, when representatives of twenty-six nations pledged their 
governments to continue fighting together against the Axis Powers.17  
However the UN was officially brought into existence on October 24, 1945, 
representing fifty-one countries.18 
 
democratic-peoples-republic-of/ [https://perma.cc/QNL3-VGK3]. 
 7. A jus cogens offence (translation: peremptory law offence) is an “overriding 
principle of international law” from which “no derogation is ever permitted.”  Jus cogens, 
CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/jus_cogens 
[https://perma.cc/9K6G-ATCP]. 
 8. Olivia Enos, North Korea is the World’s Worst Persecutor of Christians, FORBES, 
(Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/oliviaenos/2017/01/25/north-korea-is-the-
worlds-worst-persecutor-of-christians/#3424b376318e [https://perma.cc/4W3D-LAT2]; 
Robert Park, Genocide in North Korea, WORLD POL’Y BLOG (Feb. 2, 2012, 5:24 PM), 
http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2012/02/06/genocide-north-korea 
[https://perma.cc/2C8P-7WM2]. 
 9. Park, supra note 8. 
 10. History of United Nations, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/sections/history/history-united-nations/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/9K62-V7H4]. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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The nascent UN Security Council denounced an aggressive war for the 
first time when North Korea invaded South Korea.19  The USSR, a permanent 
member with veto power, could have prevented any resolutions hostile to 
North Kore, but the nation failed to appear to meetings, which the UNSC 
deemed not a boycott but simple absence. 20 In fact, Joseph Stalin, who 
negotiated for the division of Korea against the will of the Korean people 
after WWII, plotted and backed the Korean War from the beginning.21  Sadly, 
two U.S. colonels capitulated to this demand.22 
The Soviets trained and planted the initial Supreme Ruler of North 
Korea, Kim Il-Sung, who awaited Stalin’s green light before commencing the 
Korean War.23  In response, a U.S. led UN coalition fought to defend South 
Korea, restoring the original line of demarcation, the 38th parallel.24  Even 
after the armistice, which North Korea has repeatedly broken and renounced, 
the so-called Demilitarized Zone (“DMZ”) has remained the most militarized 
border on planet earth. 
This work lays a basic doctrinal foundation as well as suggested 
applications to consider for resolving the dual security and human rights 
crises of the DPRK.  The three doctrines are the doctrines of international 
humanitarian intervention (“IHI”), the responsibility to protect (“R2P”) and 
legitimate defense.  These doctrines arguably apply most urgently to the 
DPRK’s gross, systematic human rights violations and security threats—
more than they do anywhere else.  R2P, IHI and legitimate defense seriously 
undergird efforts to resolve the DPRK crises. 
I. History of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
After World War II, North Korea controlled all the remaining industries 
in the country, and retained all the benefits it received from the Soviet Union 
in the form of money, food, military weaponry and tactical training.25  The 
Soviet Union also provided North Korea with advice on how to create a 
government and a dictatorship as Joseph Stalin had.26  This political advice 
 
 19. See Allan R. Millett, Korean War: 1950–1953, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/event/Korean-War [https://perma.cc/BW35-6NKH]. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Katheryn Weathersby, Soviet Aims In Korea And The Origins Of The Korean 
War, 1945–50: New Evidence From Russian Archives 9, 35–36 (Woodrow Wilson Int’l 
Center For Scholars, Working Paper No. 8, 1993). 
 22. Id. 
 23. VICTOR CHA, THE IMPOSSIBLE STATE: NORTH KOREA, PAST AND FUTURE 70–71 
(2012); Kim Il Sung, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA: BRITANNICA ACADEMIC (Jan. 13, 2014), 
https://academic.eb.com/levels/collegiate/article/Kim-Il-Sung/45457 
[https://perma.cc/G7AM-LGM5]; Millet, supra note 19. 
 24. Millet, supra note 19. 
 25. See CHARLES K. ARMSTRONG, THE NORTH KOREAN REVOLUTION, 1945–1950 153, 
156. 
 26. See CHA, supra note 23, at 70–71 (explaining briefly Kim Il Sung’s rise to power 
with Soviet backing). 
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has been followed by Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jong-Il, and now Kim Jong-Un.27  
As the central focus of its social organization, the North Korean government 
rewards loyalty and punishes perceived disloyalty through draconian and 
inhumane punishment.28  The official state philosophy is called Juchè.29  
Juchè imagines the state as a metaphorical socio-political human body, in 
which the Supreme Ruler acts as the brain, the party acts as the nerves, and 
the people act as the arms, legs, and muscles.30  This forms the thought that 
the people do not need to think because the Supreme Leader (currently Kim 
Jong-Un) does all the thinking for the entire country.  This explains why 
North Korea considers its population as mere property of little value 
compared to the actually irreducible value of every human life.31 
The DPRK demonstrates its power to its citizens in order to bolster its 
control and legitimacy in the eyes of its people.  North Korea constantly feeds 
the citizens false reports to dupe them into illegitimate allegiance and false 
loyalty.32  Kim Jong-Il held the title of Supreme Leader during the worst 
famine North Korea had ever experienced up to that time, the extermination 
of large numbers of dissenters, and other dire conditions that motivated 
refugees to flee the country.33  These tragic events plummeted the DPRK into 
below subsistence economic and political levels.34  The DPRK made no 
adjustments to combat these events, instead asking its people to eat only two 
paltry meals a day and to tighten their belt two notches to show support for 
the revolution.35  As the country’s outlook became even worse, the 
government continued to wax corrupt, with government officials using food 
and resources as leverage to prey on the population.36  The DPRK, even 
including the most recent studies, ranks as the most corrupt country in the 
world.37  It also now reportedly faces yet another historic famine.38 
 
 27. See Charlie Campbell, The Despotic Dynasty: A Family Tree of North Korea’s 
Kim Clan, TIME (Feb. 24, 2017), http://time.com/4681304/north-korea-kim-family-album/ 
[https://perma.cc/X4NY-5QSY]. 
 28. Phil Robertson, North Korea’s Caste System: The Trouble with Songbun, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH (July 5, 2016, 11:18 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/05/north-
koreas-caste-system [https://perma.cc/NKG6-GRTT]. 
 29. CHA, supra note 23. 
 30. Id. at 42–43. 
 31. See id. at 136. 
 32. See id. at 78, 136. 
 33. See id. at 88, 92. 
 34. Id. at 92. 
 35. Id. at 126. 
 36. Id. at 127. 
 37. The World’s Most Corrupt Countries, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/09/world/most-corrupt-countries-list.html 
[https://perma.cc/VQ6L-H7ZE]. 
 38. Jay Akbar, North Korea Faces Worst Famine in Two Decades While Kim Jong-
Un Spends His Time Chasing Nuclear Dream and Criticising ‘Weird’ Donald Trump, 
DAILY MAIL (Aug. 24, 2017, 12:02 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
4820220/North-Korea-faces-worst-famine-two-decades.html [https://perma.cc/X8XT-
ADC3]. 
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Victor Cha, a Georgetown scholar who has written extensively on North 
Korea, has stated that North Korea operates more like an organized crime unit 
than an actual country caring for its citizens.39  North Korea actively 
participates in narcotics trafficking, money laundering, fraud, and 
transactional crime.40  North Korea also engages in counterfeiting both 
currency and pharmaceutical products.41  Their counterfeit currency is 
sometimes called a “supernote” because it is convincing enough to fool 
government officials in other countries.42  The North Korean regime also 
heavily funds heroin labs in order to increase its illegitimate income.43  The 
regime does not care much about their citizens’ welfare, but more about the 
Supreme Leader’s and elite’s wealth.44  Ironically, in the most extreme of the 
few remaining Communist regimes, this elite bourgeoisie still crush the 
proletariat.  Then again, every single Communist regime in history has done 
so. 
North Korea directly participates in carrying out global cyber-attacks, 
espionage, fraud, blackmail, and money laundering.45  North Korea also 
supplies much of the world’s illicit opium and methamphetamine drug 
trade.46  Yet in 2015, North Korea had a per capita Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) of a mere $1700, with an estimated real growth rate of -1.1%.47  In 
comparison, South Korea in the same year had a per capita GDP of $37,500, 
with an estimated  real growth rate of three percent.48  Meanwhile, Kim Jong-
 
 39. CHA, supra note 23, at 129–30.  Professor Cha was nominated as a possible U.S. 
Ambassador to South Korea; however, President Trump appointed retired Navy Four Star 
Admiral (over the Pacific fleet) Harry Harris instead.  Josh Rogin, Trump Should Name 
His Asia Team Before His Tour There, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2017/10/18/trump-should-name-
his-asia-team-before-his-tour-there/ [https://perma.cc/Q86R-AZR2]. 
 40. CHA, supra note 23, at 129. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 134–35. 
 43. Id. at 133. 
 44. See id. at 81, 138–39. 
 45. Id. at 129; Alex Ward, North Korea’s Kim Jong Un May Have Had His Best Year 
Yet, VOX, https://www.vox.com/world/2017/12/22/16805426/north-korea-trump-
missile-kim-threat-2017 (last updated Dec. 28, 2017, 9:01 AM) [https://perma.cc/CDZ4-
UGZ9]. 
 46. Larry Wortzel, Adjunct Research Professor, U.S. Army War College, Testimony 
on North Korea’s Connection to International Trade in Drugs, Counterfeiting, and Arms 
Before the Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Financial Management, Budget, and 
International Security (May 20, 2003), https://www.heritage.org/testimony/north-koreas-
connection-international-trade-drugs-counterfeiting-and-arms [https://perma.cc/M9PV-
ZTZW]. 
 47. North Korea GDP - Per Capita (PPP), INDEX MUNDI, 
https://www.indexmundi.com/north_korea/gdp_per_capita_(ppp).html (last updated Jan. 
20, 2018) [https://perma.cc/J9LN-Z9S5]; North Korea GDP – Real Growth Rate, INDEX 
MUNDI, https://www.indexmundi.com/north_korea/gdp_real_growth_rate.html (last 
updated Jan. 20, 2018) [https://perma.cc/ZJ9U-NVZV]. 
 48. South Korea GDP - Per Capita (PPP), INDEX MUNDI, 
https://www.indexmundi.com/south_korea/gdp_per_capita_(ppp).html (last updated Jan. 
20, 2018) [https://perma.cc/WCS3-NKSM]; INDEX MUNDI, South Korea GDP – Real 
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Un has amassed a personal net worth of over five billion U.S. dollars, while 
most of his population has been deemed food insecure.49 
North Korea is a prison of a country.  The regime does not allow its 
citizens to move around North Korea without permission, and deems leaving 
the country high treason.50  North Korea orders its border guards to shoot to 
kill those who attempt to leave the country, whether men, women or 
children.51  The regime assigns their living location, educational 
opportunities, work assignments, rations, clothing, and housing arrangements 
based on perceived loyalty.52  The regime allows the most loyal citizens to 
live in Pyongyang, which has well maintained roads and the best material 
living environment in the country.53  Outside Pyongyang, the roads are made 
of dirt, and the citizens have little clothing and shoes.54  The government 
determines where citizens live based on family lineage and loyalty shown 
towards the DPRK.55  North Korea’s isolation has proven to be a strategic 
advantage because the regime’s victims are faceless and nameless, they 
receive no contact with the outside world, and their stories are not shared or 
known unless they are able to escape and have the courage to divulge the 
devastating conditions.56  Courageously, a stream of defector narratives have 
emerged over the past decade, giving researchers and other interested readers 
more stories from which to piece together the reclusive regime and isolated 
society. 
II. North Korea and America 
In 2017, North Korea made major news headlines for its continuing 
missile tests and nuclear development, as well as for its verbal exchanges with 
United States President, Donald Trump.57  Prior to entering office, President 
Trump discussed North Korea more than any other presidential candidate.  
North Korea has been on the president’s radar for years. He spoke out about 
North Korea during an interview with Tim Russert during the Clinton 
administration. During his presidential campaign, President Trump 
 
Growth Rate, https://www.indexmundi.com/south_korea/gdp_real_growth_rate.html (last 
updated Jan. 20, 2018) [https://perma.cc/NN3U-T4JL]. 
 49. CHA, supra note 23, at 163; Kim Jong-un Net Worth, CELEBRITY NET WORTH, 
https://www.celebritynetworth.com/richest-politicians/presidents/kim-jong-un-net-worth/ 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2018) [https://perma.cc/9TPS-PR6V]. 
 50. North Korea Criminal Code, art. 62, Mar. 3, 1950, last amended Oct. 19, 2009. 
 51. Ryan Pickrell, North Korea Orders Border Guards to Shoot Defectors on Sight, 
DAILY CALLER (Dec. 18, 2017, 4:31PM), http://dailycaller.com/2017/12/18/north-korea-
orders-border-guards-to-shoot-defectors-on-sight/ [https://perma.cc/UF8X-F9RE]. 
 52. See CHA, supra note 23, at 162–63, 168–70. 
 53. See GUY DELISLE, PYONGYANG: A JOURNEY IN NORTH KOREA 25 (2007). 
 54. See id. at 57. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Utkarsh Singh, Inside Under Cover in North Korea|Nat Geo Documentary, 
YOUTUBE (Dec. 14, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AlJUGZPanB8 
[https://perma.cc/4Y7T-TWC9]. 
 57. Ward, supra note 45. 
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repeatedly mentioned the nuclear threat North Korea poses to the United 
States, as well as the control that China would be able to exert over North 
Korea to “solve the problem.”58 
Early in 2017, North Korea launched its first ballistic missile test of the 
Trump presidency, shortly followed by four more missile launches into the 
Sea of Japan, threatening the United States ally in the region.59  North Korea 
continued to conduct missile launches over Japan and other U.S. allies until 
the first Summit in Singapore; experts believe these missiles are capable of 
reaching the United States or even over the U.S.  In addition to mastering 
ballistic missiles, North Korea also claims to have successfully completed an 
underground hydrogen bomb test, and to have created a hydrogen bomb small 
enough to fit on a missile.60  A hydrogen bomb, if used, would be hundreds 
or thousands of times more powerful than lesser nuclear weapons.61  
However, North Korea has yet to demonstrate that it has precision guidance 
mastered, the ability to carry a heavy payload, or full re-entry capabilities. 
North Korea’s military actions earned them a formal condemnation of 
the country’s missile launches from the United Nations Security Council, 
which called for Pyongyang to “immediately” cease its aggressive actions.62  
Sanctions were unanimously imposed in August of 2017 against North Korea 
by the UN Security Council.63  These sanctions banned exports of mineral 
and seafood products (which comprised a third of the country’s total exports 
in the year 2016), and were imposed in direct response to North Korea’s tests 
of intercontinental ballistic missiles and its pursuit of nuclear weapons.64  In 
September of 2017, the UN Security Council once again passed sanctions 
 
 58. Id.; Carl Prine, Could the Unthinkable Happen With North Korea?, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB. (Apr. 15, 2017, 7:35 PM), 
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/military/sd-me-korea-conflict-20170415-
story.html [https://perma.cc/9C44-B343]. 
 59. Joshua Berlinger et al., Trump Says ‘All Options On Table’ After North Korea 
Fires Missile Over Japan, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/28/politics/north-korea-
launch-unidentified-projectile/index.html (last updated Aug. 29, 2017, 8:17 PM) 
[https://perma.cc/88GS-C54D]. 
 60. David E. Sanger & Choe Sang-Hun, North Korean Nuclear Test Draws U.S. 
Warning of ‘Massive Military Response’, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/03/world/asia/north-korea-tremor-possible-6th-
nuclear-test.html [http://perma.cc/8EMW-XDA9]. 
 61. James Griffiths & Angela Dewan, What is a Hydrogen Bomb and Can North 
Korea Deliver One?, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/03/asia/hydrogen-bomb-north-
korea-explainer/index.html (last updated Sept. 22, 2017, 3:15 AM) 
[https://perma.cc/AZ24-6VBR]. 
 62. Euan McKirdy & Richard Roth, UN Security Council Condemns North Korean 
Missile Launch, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/21/politics/unsc-north-korea-
resolution/index.html (last updated Apr. 21, 2017, 1:36 AM) [https://perma.cc/65CC-
BMEK]. 
 63. UN Security Council Unanimously Adopts New Sanctions on N. Korea Over 
Missile Tests, CBS NEWS, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-n-security-council-
unanimously-adopts-new-sanctions-on-north-korea-over-missile-tests/ (last updated Aug. 
5, 2017, 4:55 PM) [https://perma.cc/ZAX2-4596]. 
 64. Id. 
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against North Korea, that limited its oil imports, and banned textile exports 
from the country.65  These sanctions are considered the “toughest ever” 
against North Korea, and were passed in an effort to deprive North Korea of 
income so that the country cannot continue its nuclear and ballistic missile 
program, and pressure North Korea to negotiate a way out of punishing 
sanctions.66  Notably, even China, a long-time ally and supporter of North 
Korea, voted in favor of the sanctions, and took moves to implement them.67 
More recently, however, China has been breaching the sanctions and calling 
upon the UN Security Council to relax them. 
Despite the United Nations’ sanctions, and sharp warnings from the 
United States, North Korea continues to retain its intercontinental ballistic 
missiles as well as nuclear and hydrogen weapons. 
In addition to posing a nuclear threat and demonstrating its potential for 
chemical weapons, North Korea is also responsible for the likely torture, and 
death of American student, Otto Warmbier.68  Otto Warmbier was an 
American college student visiting North Korea when he was arrested in 
January 2016 for “hostile acts against the state” after attempting to remove a 
poster from his hotel.69  Warmbier was sentenced to fifteen years of hard 
labor.70  Shortly after his detention began, North Korean officials stated that 
Warmbier contracted botulism after taking a sleeping pill, which led to him 
falling into a coma.71  He was detained in North Korea for over a year before 
being returned home, only to pass away six days later.72  Although no autopsy 
was performed (at the family’s request), Warmbier’s parents do not believe 
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North Korea’s version of what happened to their son, and remained convinced 
that their son was brutally tortured at the hands of North Korea.73  A U.S. 
court awarded the Warmbiers 550 million dollars for their grievous 
loss, which the DPRK has refused to pay thus far.  This amount, 
ironically enough, approximates the amount that President Kim 
Dae-Jung handed over to Kim Jong-Il for nothing in return under 
the failed Sunshine Policy. 
III. The Doctrines of IHI and R2P 
The doctrines of “international humanitarian intervention” and 
“responsibility to protect” justify intervention in countries without the 
intervened country’s permission or consent.  These doctrines have been used 
by the United States and the NATO member states, including the United 
Kingdom, to justify just that.74  The United Kingdom entered countries such 
as the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq for multiple 
different purposes under the cover of these doctrines.75  The following will 
explicate both doctrines that could support state intervention into North 
Korea. 
A. The Doctrine of International Humanitarian Intervention 
In the 1990s, following the horrors in Rwanda and the Balkans, serious 
debate ensued on how to effectively react to atrocities.76  Do other states have 
the right to intervene in another sovereign country?  The Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan, in his Millennium Report of 2000, challenged Member States: 
“If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on 
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to gross 
and systematic violation of human rights that offend every precept of our 
common humanity?”77 
The doctrine of international humanitarian intervention (IHI) is based on 
the simple concept of the defense of others.  It is similar to the defense of 
others doctrine in criminal law, but operates on a much larger scale.  The two 
types of IHI are non-forcible and forcible.  Non-forcible includes sanctions 
 
 73. Svrluga & Fifield, supra note 69. 
 74. See SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN 
AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 183 (1996); About R2P, GLOBAL CTR. FOR RESP. TO 
PROTECT, http://www.globalr2p.org/about_r2p [https://perma.cc/5R5X-3QXF]. 
 75. See Thomas M. Franck, Interpretation and Change in the Law of Humanitarian 
Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL 
DILEMMAS 220, 224 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003); John Simpson, Did 
UK Intervention in Afghanistan Have Any Value?, BBC NEWS (Oct. 27, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-29788534 [https://perma.cc/V6CL-QTPK]. 
 76. Background Information on the Responsibility to Protect, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgresponsibility.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/97N5-6TBY]. 
 77. U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 
21st Century, ¶ 217, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (Mar. 27, 2000). 
TAN FORMATTED (6-15-18) 3/7/2019  10:53 AM 
2018 North Korea as the Primary Consideration 11 
and diplomatic efforts.  The forcible version must satisfy the classic just war 
principles: just cause, last resort, good over harm, proportionality, right 
intention and reasonable prospect.  The case of the DPRK meets all of these 
principles. However, there is still much concern about the potentially large 
cost in lives and resources.  Legally, a state of war already persists because 
the DPRK has disavowed the cease fire (Armistice) both verbally and through 
its non-verbal, hostile actions. 
One working definition of the doctrine of International Humanitarian 
Intervention is “the use of force to protect people in another State from gross 
and systematic human rights violations committed against them, or more 
generally to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, when the target State is 
unwilling or unable to act.”78  A similar definition from Sean Murphy is “the 
threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international organizations 
primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from 
widespread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights, whether 
or not the intervention is authorized by the target state or the international 
community.”79  Both of these definitions would exclude non-forcible 
intervention by calling it humanitarian assistance.  For the purposes of this 
Article though, humanitarian assistance falls within IHI as non-forcible 
intervention. 
The International Humanitarian Intervention doctrine utilizes Chapter 
VII of the United Nations Charter, specifically Articles 41, 42, and 43.  The 
Charter gives the Security Council powers to prevent any threat to or breach 
of the peace.80  Threats to peace include violations against a State’s own 
citizens, not just threats to other nations.81  Article 41 serves as a gatekeeper 
to get the intervention process moving towards solving the state’s violations.  
Article 41 states, 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed 
force are to be employed to give effect to its decision, and it may call upon the 
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.  These may include 
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, 
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of 
diplomatic relations.82 
This is a non-military effort to bring the state back into compliance. 
If nothing is solved through article 41, articles 42 and 43 are then allowed 
to be imposed.  Article 42 states, 
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Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 
would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by 
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace 
and security.  Such action may include demonstrations, blockades, and other 
operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.83 
Article 43 builds upon Article 42, giving member states parameters with 
which to work: 
(1) All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of 
international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security 
Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, 
armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for 
the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. 
(2) Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, 
their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and 
assistance to be provided. 
(3) The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the 
initiative of the Security Council.  They shall be concluded between the Security 
Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and 
shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their 
respective constitutional processes.84 
This allows the United Nations Security Council to use military forces to 
intervene and help cure the human rights violations, but again, this is only 
allowed if the non-military actions failed under Article 41.  These three 
articles form the basis of the International Humanitarian Intervention doctrine 
under the UN Charter. 
As stated above, the United Nations Security Council has the option to 
use non-forcible intervention as well as forcible intervention.  The non-
forcible actions that can be taken include economic sanctions or diplomatic 
action, taken by a Member State or a group of Member States with the 
intention of getting the noncompliant state to remedy its human rights 
abuses.85  A sub-type of intervention allows a member state to rescue its own 
citizens that are in the noncompliant state’s custody.86 
Forcible intervention constitutes the threat or use of force by a state or 
group of states against an offending state without the offending state’s 
permission.87  This type of intervention, again, is allowed under Articles 42 
and 43.  Both non-forcible and forcible intervention allow member states to 
act within a sovereign state without the permission of that state due to the 
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gross and systematic human rights violations occurring or threatening to 
occur in the immediate future.  The action aims to protect the citizens’ human 
rights and end the violations.88 
When genocide threatens a large number of lives, and the state cannot or 
will not act to avert these disasters, then members of the international 
community have a responsibility to protect those at risk according to the 
Genocide Convention.  Forcible humanitarian intervention must meet six 
principles.89  These principles must be weighed before the United Nations 
will authorize intervention in North Korea.  The six humanitarian intervention 
principles are: just cause, last resort, good over harm, proportionality, right 
intention, and reasonable prospect.90  Sovereign states often argue that what 
is done within their borders with their citizens is their own business, and the 
international community should not get involved.  However, the essence of 
sovereignty is responsibility, and the international community has agreed that 
states do not have the absolute right to do whatever they want to do to people 
within their state boundaries.91  In the face of gross, systematic violations of 
human rights, members of the international community have the right to 
intervene.92 
This Article will elaborate upon each of the six IHI principles and how 
North Korea easily passes the threshold, thus allowing intervention within the 
state.  North Korea finds itself increasingly ripe as a candidate for forcible 
intervention as a means to stop the gross and systematic human rights 
violations plaguing the citizens of that state. 
The first principle to analyze when deciding if a humanitarian 
intervention is permissible is just cause.  Just cause asks whether or not the 
state is committing actual or anticipated large-scale extermination of life or 
ethnic cleansing.93  The international community must consider the scale of 
the loss of life and whether the state under consideration can or will act to 
protect its citizens.94  Intervention is not limited to post-war situations.  For 
example, just cause may be justified if a state’s collapse risks exposing the 
citizens to mass starvation, as transpired in Somalia.95  Natural disasters for 
which the state cannot or will not act to protect its own citizens constitute 
another type of example.  The threshold of gross and systematic human rights 
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violations or human suffering to permit intervention seeks to prevent 
pretextual interventions over minor violations.96 
The detention camps and mass extermination that have taken place in 
North Korea for many years would more than satisfy the just cause 
requirement of forcible humanitarian intervention.  On the genocide side of 
just cause, the original Supreme Ruler (suryong) Kim Il-Sung instituted the 
systematic persecution of Christians, destroying the former center of 
Christianity in Asia.97  The original Supreme Ruler averred: 
[We] cannot carry religiously active people along on our march toward a communist 
society.  Therefore, we have tried and executed all religious leaders higher than 
deacon in the Protestant and Catholic churches.  Among other religiously active 
people, those deemed malignant were all put to trial.  Among ordinary religious 
believers, those who recanted were given jobs while those who did not were held in 
concentration camps.98 
Every study (whether the United States Commission on International 
Religious Freedom, Open Doors, or Voice of the Martyrs) of the persecution 
of Christians worldwide over the past couple of decades has found that North 
Korea is the worst persecutor, bar none.99  Pyongyang now features two sham 
churches run by Party members, and only small clusters of underground 
believers.100  Due to North Korea’s genocide of Christians, among many 
gross, systematic perpetration of crimes, the just cause principle for 
intervention is satisfied. 
Last resort is the second principle under the humanitarian intervention 
doctrine.  This principle at its core ties back into Articles 41, 42, and 43.  
Forcible intervention may be used if economic sanctions and diplomatic 
measures have not had their intended effects.101  Nonmilitary options for 
prevention or peaceful solutions have to be explored; however, every possible 
option does not have to be tried and fail.102  Sometimes the need is so great 
that there is not enough time to try every conceivable option before forcible 
intervention is necessary.103  The last resort requirement is satisfied if, having 
considered the array of options, there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
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none of the lesser measures will succeed.104 
Here, neither the economic sanctions nor diplomatic actions taken in 
response to North Korea have substantially improved the human rights 
landscape to date. The newest UNSC sanctions put into effect in 2015–
2017—most recently in August and September of 2017—would squeeze 
North Korea more than ever if faithfully implemented.105  Both China and 
Russia claim they will implement these sanctions.106  Their actions, however, 
speak more loudly than their words.  While China took steps in this 
direction,107 Russia has yet to do so, and China has slipped back in this regard.  
Enforcement and implementation of the sanctions, especially by these two 
countries, would be most important towards achieving the desired effect.108  
The United States, Japan, and South Korea can provide a united front towards 
influencing China and Russia in this direction.  However, South Korea has 
itself failed in fully implementing the sanctions. South Korea has also 
prematurely closed its North Korean Human Rights office, despite the fact 
that the UN North Korean Human Rights Special Rapporteur has noted no 
material improvements in North Korean human rights. 
The third principle to analyze for forcible intervention is good over 
harm.  This principle calls for creating a better situation within the state than 
the harm caused by the intervention.109  In determining this, the international 
community must balance the harm that will occur due to the forcible 
intervention within the state against the good that will likely result.110  This 
principle is the most unpredictable of the bases for forcible intervention, 
because it is impossible to predict the future.  The most significant concern 
on the harm side is how North Korea would react to an intervention based on 
the large-scale human rights violations being committed by and within the 
state.  The three different dictators over North Korea, to be frank, qualify as 
morally atrocious, albeit rational, in a narrowly self-interested sense, to an 
extent.111  Kim Jong-Un, the current dictator, might be the most feared, as he 
is the most extreme of his family line; he has imprisoned and killed high 
ranking military personnel, as well as those within his own family.112  Who 
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knows what he would do if the international community tried to step in?  
However, there are a number of factors in favor of intervention: the extreme 
gravity of the human rights violations that have taken place for far too long; 
the increasingly superior military capabilities of the United States, South 
Korea, and Japan, both in defense and offence; the decreasing supply with 
which the North Korean military can fight; the prospect of reunification; and 
the possibility of a minimally surgical use of force.  Overall, the situation is 
inherently complex and uncertain, making definitive analysis and 
prognostication difficult at best. 
The fourth principle for consideration regarding intervention is 
proportionality.  This principle relates to the good over harm principle, but 
weighs issues such as the military action necessary to end the human rights 
violations, and the cost in human life and suffering from forcible intervention 
compared to the cost incurred under the current regime.113  Regarding the 
necessary amount of military action, the scale, duration, and intensity of the 
intervention should be only as much as needed to resolve the crisis.  The 
intervention should be proportionate with the stated purpose, and in line with 
the magnitude of the problem.114  Regarding the cost in human life, it is 
important to try to ensure that the harm from the force used to eliminate 
human right violations does not exceed the harm from the current abuses.115 
North Korea has many conventional weapons aimed at Seoul, which is 
thirty-five miles away from the Korean border, and promises to destroy that 
city.116  However, Seoul has an extensive network of subterranean bomb 
shelters within its subway system, providing a ready place for civilians to 
seek shelter.117  Furthermore, the U.S. military has the ability to destroy units 
as the first round of projectiles is en route to its target.118  North Korea’s 
artillery is reportedly not the most accurate and is limited in its range so that 
it is doubtful that it can hit the southern side of Seoul.119  Additionally, North 
Korea’s fuel supply reportedly could only support around five full days of 
fighting.120  North Korea is using more of its precious fuel keeping its planes 
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in the air because of the U.S. and South Korean planes flying in the area. 
Additionally, the United States currently helps arm its Asian allies in the 
area.  South Korea procures defense systems from the United States.  If it 
procures the best available technology, it can include systems like Iron Dome, 
Iron Beam, LaW, PAC-4 (once it is fully developed), high velocity 
projectiles, and both sea and land-based Aegis systems, as well as other 
missile defense systems such as THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area 
Defense), of which two batteries have been fully installed to date.121  Japan 
has also been procuring defense systems from the United States, including for 
example, the land based Aegis system.122  The better the defense systems in 
place, the less damage North Korea can inflict, which can weigh positively in 
a proportionality estimation. 
Proportionality also requires us to consider actors other than the Koreas 
and the United States.  Potential attacks upon Japan, nuclear or otherwise, and 
Japan’s available defenses would also factor into the mix.123  Furthermore, 
China is an ally of North Korea and has said many times that it will defend 
North Korea against any adversary.124  However, more recently China stated 
publicly that it would not defend North Korea if it attacked first, but would 
defend it if it were attacked first.125  Moreover, the relationship between China 
and North Korea is at a low point: Chinese banks have restricted business 
with North Korea, some North Korean businesses in China have been closed, 
and North Korean workers in China have returned to North Korea.126  North 
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Korea has also publicly denounced China, while China has publicly 
complained about North Korea. On the other hand, Kim, Jong-Un has 
travelled to China to meet with President Xi and other officials before and 
after the 1st Summit, and in the leadup to the 2nd Summit with President 
Trump. 
China does not want the United States or a U.S. ally to border them.127  
As such, the U.S. could ask China to help reunify the Koreas, peacefully if 
possible, in exchange for a scaling down of U.S. military assets from the 
unified Korean peninsula.  That would appear potentially worthwhile for all 
countries involved and could obviate proportionality considerations. 
The fifth principle analyzes whether the intervening country has the right 
intention.  This principle means that the intervening state or states’ primary 
reason must be to avert human suffering.128  An intervening state will most 
likely have additional reasons to intervene besides the humanitarian purpose, 
but the rule is that the main reason must be humanitarian in order to ensure 
that states minimize force and focus on ending the human rights abuses.129  
This principle is controversial amongst scholars, because many believe 
motives are irrelevant while results are supreme.130  These scholars believe 
that as long as the intervention protects human rights, the motive which 
prompted the intervention is irrelevant.131  However, motives are important 
regarding the morality and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention.  At the 
same time, motives, realistically speaking, are often mixed. 
Regarding North Korea, the states that would intervene would likely be 
concerned with the human rights violations and the passing of weapons and 
technology to terrorist groups, both of which would satisfy this principle.132  
A major matter that the intervening states would have in mind would be 
shutting down the concentration and work camps and freeing the many people 
suffering severely therein.133  This would overlook the “free” citizens, most 
of whom have no legal access to knowledge of the outside world or how 
citizens are to be treated by their government.134 A peaceful reunification that 
ended the Kim Dynasty would prove ideal, in spite of the attendant challenges 
 
 127. See Albert & Xu, supra note 124; Christopher Green, Why China Won’t Punish 
North Korea For Its Rocket Launch, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 7, 2016), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/feb/07/why-china-wont-punish-north-
korea [https://perma.cc/3GGM-J3MW]. 
 128. Wheeler, supra note 90, at 558. 
 129. TAN, supra note 87, at 253. 
 130. See, e.g., Heinze, supra note 90, at 22–24. 
 131. See, e.g., id. at 23–24. 
 132. See TAN, supra note 87, at 251, 253. 
 133. Joanna Walters, “They are Intentionally Starved and Worked to Death”: The 
Horrific Conditions in North Korean Labor Camps, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2016), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/they-are-intentionally-starved-and-worked-to-death-the-
horrific-conditions-in-north-korean-labor-camps-2016-3 [https://perma.cc/3ZUV-SSVJ]. 
 134. See Rick Newman, Here’s How Lousy Life Is in North Korea, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 
12, 2013), https://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/rick-newman/2013/04/12/heres-how-
lousy-life-is-in-north-korea [https://perma.cc/PW3S-7LRT]. 
TAN FORMATTED (6-15-18) 3/7/2019  10:53 AM 
2018 North Korea as the Primary Consideration 19 
it would bring. 
The last principle of IHI asks about the reasonable prospects of success.  
An intervention is justified when there is a reasonable opportunity for success 
in halting or averting the gross and systematic violations of human rights.135  
Intervention in North Korea almost certainly would halt the human right 
violations; North Korea would most likely overwhelmingly lose a full-blown 
war, if it comes to that.136  Also, more surgical uses of force as well as robust 
defensive measures could markedly decrease casualties below the level of the 
currently common fears; South Korea and the U.S. have made the exercises 
for decapitation attacks targeting the top leadership of North Korea public 
knowledge.137  Because of the legal state of war and because such attacks 
would be against military leadership, they would not constitute 
assassinations.  The risk of miscalculation, mistakes and/or limited strikes 
leading to escalation of the fighting exists.  However, a quick, surgical 
operation followed by a takeover of the command and control structure 
concluded by a rapid reunification also could happen.  Immediate 
reunification could prevent nightmare scenarios, such as competing generals 
increasing the fighting inside and outside the peninsula. 
These six principles provide guidance for decisions based on IHI.  The 
UN Security Council has already been employing non-forcible intervention 
under Article 41 of the Charter, including in the recent resolutions in August 
and September of 2017.  The original UN Security Council resolution 
authorizing the use of force to repel the aggressive war by North Korea still 
stands.138  Reportedly, all options remain on the table.  Ideally, peaceful 
reunification could yet transpire. Strong, robust diplomacy bolstered by 
forcible options in the background would give the best opportunity for such 
a resolution.  
B. Doctrine of Responsibility to Protect 
International Humanitarian Intervention doctrine leaves a dearth of 
specific guidance on how to intervene within a sovereign state and what kind 
of authority the United Nations and member states have upon intervening.139  
The doctrine also lacks a decision-making body and a decision-making 
process for determining whether either non-forcible or forcible intervention 
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is warranted.140 
These issues helped create a variation to the doctrine of International 
Humanitarian Intervention called the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).  The 
main focus of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine is to help create a 
decision-making process while balancing the right to intervene within a 
sovereign state. 
In the beginning of the 1990s, the Responsibility to Protect doctrine 
started to incorporate the concept of human security.141  Human security 
means “freedom from fear—freedom from these pervasive threats to people’s 
rights, safety, or lives.”142 
This change in international law had an impact on how the United 
Nations and individual countries saw the doctrines of the Responsibility to 
Protect and International Humanitarian Intervention.  As discussed supra, the 
international community has collectively started taking responsibility to 
protect individuals when sovereign governments have proved powerless or 
unwilling to prevent gross human right violations within their own borders.  
This change in view was prompted by Canada’s ICISS report,143 the UN High 
Level Panel Report,144 and 2005 World Summit Outcome Report Concerning 
Responsibility to Protect.145 
These developments allowed the United Nations to authorize forcible 
humanitarian intervention if the intervention is approved by the United 
Nations Security Council upon passing the five precautionary principles.  
These five principles are: (1) The Principle of the Seriousness of the Threat: 
is the threat in question serious enough to justify the use of military force?  
(2) The Proper Purpose Principle: is it clear that the primary purpose of the 
proposed military action is to stop or avoid the humanitarian catastrophe in 
question?  (3) The Principle of Last Resort: has the range of non-military 
options been explored?  (4) The Proportionality Principle: is the use of force 
proportionate to the objectives sought to be secured?  (5) The Balance of 
Consequences Principle: is the intervention likely to be successful, and the 
consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of 
inaction?146 
The Responsibility to Protect doctrine may be summarized by its three 
pillars as follows: (1) sovereign states have the obligation to protect their own 
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people; (2) the international community should support the sovereign 
countries’ efforts to do so; (3) if the sovereign fails or refuses to protect its 
own people, or worst yet, grossly and systematically violates its own people, 
then the responsibility to protect devolves to the international community, 
which must respond in a timely and decisive way.147 The immediate past 
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, a proponent of this doctrine, has managed 
to obtain broad support for it.148  Its application to the DPRK is easy to see 
yet again, but prudential judgments remain in how to apply it. 
The three advantages of looking at an intervention from a responsibility 
to protect viewpoint are as follows: (1) the focus is on the safety of humans 
at risk, not exclusively the sovereignty of the state; (2) outside intervention 
will only take place when the state will not or cannot protect its own citizens; 
and (3) the responsibility is broad, which would not only involve the 
responsibility to react to a crisis, but also to act to prevent the crises and aid 
in rebuilding the affected society as well.149 
The Responsibility to Protect doctrine puts a premium on human 
security.  Human security in this context means freedom from pervasive 
threats to people’s rights, safety, or lives.150  This notion emerges in part from 
the transformation of International Human Rights Law in general and 
International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law in particular.  
International Law has moved from a state-oriented dimension to a people-
oriented dimension, having regard to both the struggle against impunity with 
respect to the perpetrators, and the responsibility to protect with respect to the 
victims.151  This change in focus within international law includes: (1) the 
internationalization of human rights and humanization of international law, 
(2) the protection of civilians in armed conflict and the criminalization of 
atrocities against civilians, and (3) the emergence of the individual as the 
subject, and not just the object, of international law.152 
This Responsibility to Protect doctrine crystallized in 2000.  Inspired by 
the UN Secretary General’s call to action and the demonstrable consequences 
of inaction in Bosnia and Rwanda, Canada formed the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).153 
This Commission’s report argues that, where states are unable and 
unwilling to protect their populations from mass atrocities, or where the state 
is itself the perpetrator, the international community has the responsibility to 
act.154  The ICISS Report clearly states that military intervention needs the 
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authorization of the UN Security Council by dictating there is no better or 
more appropriate body than the United Nations Security Council to authorize 
military intervention for human protection purposes.155  According to this 
report, the task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council, but to make 
the Security Council work better than it has.156  This clearly creates a central 
decision making body for when intervention should be allowed, which 
satisfies one of the big criticisms that plagued the International Humanitarian 
Intervention doctrine.  However, it also can founder on the shoals of the veto 
power wielded by its permanent members. Later in this Article, the doctrine 
of legitimate defense addresses this issue from a different angle. 
Furthermore, the United Nations High Level Panel Report in December 
2004, titled “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,” endorsed a 
collective international responsibility to protect when sovereign governments 
have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent as follows: 
We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility 
to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as 
a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large scale killing, ethnic cleansing 
or serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign 
Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.157 
This Panel Report also gave guidance on exactly what constitutes the need 
for intervention.  It also gave directives through the three pillars that helped 
define the Responsibility to Protect doctrine.  The three pillars are as follows: 
(1) The protection responsibility of the State, (2) international assistance and 
capacity building, and (3) timely and decisive response.158  I discuss each 
pillar in the following paragraphs. 
The first pillar of the R2P doctrine asserts the protection responsibility 
of the State.159  The State carries the primary responsibility for protecting its 
populations from genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.  North 
Korea easily fails this initial pillar by having concentration camps in which it 
cruelly abuses its own citizens.160  The prevention of human rights violations 
begins in the State in which these harms take place.  The State’s sovereignty 
holds them responsible for preventing human rights violations against their 
own population.161  Again, North Korea has taken no steps towards protecting 
its population or creating a widespread enjoyment of rights.  North Korea 
utterly fails the initial pillar by running concentration and hard labor camps 
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in which they imprison their own citizens and force them to work 
backbreaking days in appalling conditions.162 
If the State fails to meet the initial pillar, it brings pillar number two into 
discussion.  This pillar provides international assistance and capacity 
building.163  The pillar allows the international community to take 
responsibility to encourage and assist the State in fulfilling pillar one, 
protecting its own citizens against human right violations.164  This pillar 
analogizes this assistance with an ally assisting a state in a natural disaster.  
Moreover, it looks to equip a state that simply lacks the technical support or 
material means to protect its population sufficiently to meet its responsibility 
with this support and these means, thereby preventing human right violations 
which could trigger forcible intervention.  The noncompliant State is given a 
say in developing the policies and programs necessary to bring it back into 
compliance with its responsibilities on the human rights front.165 
North Korea has refused to allow United Nations officials investigating 
their human rights violations into the country.166  North Korea refuses to come 
to the table to help create policies or programs to bring them in compliance 
with pillar number one.  North Korea has removed monitoring equipment and 
personnel from the International Atomic Energy Association, it seeks to hide 
and deny the existence of its concentration camps, and even limits what 
visitors of the country may view by keeping them strictly on a propaganda 
tour.167  North Korea even goes to such extremes as building movie-set-type 
building facades in which only the front appears in order to give the 
impression that the population is well taken care of because of a prosperous 
society.168  North Korea has essentially spat on pillar number two, giving it 
zero respect, by rejecting efforts of the international community in remedying 
its astonishing human right violations. 
While pillars one and two focus on the prevention of human right 
violations, pillar three tilts towards early action against human rights 
violations in progress.169  Pillar three calls for timely and decisive responses 
to human right violations after the unsuccessful use of pillars one and two.  It 
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states that the international community has a responsibility to use appropriate 
diplomatic, humanitarian, or other means to protect populations from these 
crimes.170  If a State manifestly fails to protect its population, the international 
community must be prepared to take collective action to protect populations, 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.171 
Pillar three must swing into timely action through an array of possible 
options.  These options include on site investigations, fact finding missions, 
and diplomatic sanctions.  Regrettably, North Korea has not allowed fact 
finding missions or on-site investigations,172other than a very recent one 
regarding the treaty on disabilities it ratified not long ago. Diplomatic 
sanctions include sanctions against travel, luxury goods, financial transfers, 
and military goods, all of which have been enacted against North Korea, 
albeit with serious deficiencies in implementation to date.173  In the event of 
the exhaustion of non-forcible options, forcible intervention options 
remain.174 
However, the United Nations lacks a rapid-response force, meaning it 
cannot meet pillar three with timely and decisive military action in and of 
itself.175  Practically speaking, the United Nations must therefore rely on the 
militaries of states under the Responsibility to Protect doctrine if it wants to 
take forcible measures to end North Korea’s egregious human rights 
violations. 
The Responsibility to Protect doctrine provides the basis for forceful 
intervention within another sovereign state when measures taken under the 
first two pillars of the doctrine have failed.  However, the doctrine is a new 
wrinkle on the longer standing international humanitarian doctrine and does 
not yet have extensive explication within the legal precedent.  Still, the 
combination of the International Humanitarian Intervention doctrine together 
with the Responsibility to Protect could provide a double basis for 
contemplating even forcible intervention into North Korea.  The United 
States, in conjunction with South Korea and Japan, and together with the 
acquiescence or cooperation of China and Russia, has been stepping forward 
to resolve the human rights and security crises posed by North Korea.176  No 
countries are better suited to implement pillar three of R2P together with IHI. 
The International Humanitarian Intervention doctrine and the 
Responsibility to Protect doctrine lay the ground work for the United Nations 
and member states to effectively put an end to these violations.  Turning the 
wheels on both these doctrines may provide motivation for the 
aforementioned countries to stop the human rights violations.  The cry of the 
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North Korean people for their liberation from massive injustices must ring 
out for all the world to hear.  A deeper peace with justice must replace the 
ongoing war between the Koreas as well as the lesser-known war North Korea 
wages against its own people.  IHI and R2P, if we take them seriously, 
provide a foundation for pursuing a better future for the Korean peninsula, 
the region and the world. 
IV. The Problem of Unilateral Intervention 
Various scholars object to unilateral intervention, and place the UN 
Security Council in a privileged place to authorize interventions.  Given the 
already-existing authorization of the UN Security Council, would not a 
coalition of countries moving under the UN’s banner still have the ability to 
intervene in the DPRK?   
A. The View of Antoine Rougier 
The first comprehensive study of humanitarian intervention was 
published by Antoine Rougier in 1910.177  He concluded that the pretextual 
utilization of IHI looks like an ingenious technique to enter a state and take 
their independence: 
The conclusion which emerges from this study is that it is neither possible to 
separate the humanitarian from the political grounds for intervention nor to assume 
the complete disinterestedness for the intervening States . . . Whenever one power 
intervenes in the name of humanity in the domain of another power, it cannot but 
impose its concept of just and public policy on the other State, by force if necessary.  
Its intervention tends definitely to draw the State into its moral and social sphere of 
influence.  It will control the other State while preparing to dominate it.  
Humanitarian intervention consequently looks like an ingenious juridical technique 
to encroach little by little upon the independence of a State in order to reduce it 
progressively to the status of semi-sovereignty.178 
While IHI can function along these lines, it does not necessarily apply in this 
way.  Pretextual usage should not vitiate the legitimate use of the doctrine 
itself.  The application of the doctrine can be compatible with an 
approximation of justice that improves upon the current state of gross 
injustice.  While mixed motives may be common, the self-interested aspects 
do not automatically outweigh or cancel out the humanitarian ones. 
B. The View of Francis A. Boyle 
Francis A. Boyle, professor of international law at the University of 
Illinois, delved into the history of U.S. military intervention from the Spanish 
American War of 1898 up to the Good Neighbor Policy of President Franklin 
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Roosevelt’s administration starting in 1932.179  All of these American military 
interventions touted humanitarian grounds, but Professor Boyle interprets this 
reasoning as propaganda for the purpose of building support for military 
intervention among the public.180  Boyle came to the conclusion that “under 
international law, humanitarian intervention is a joke and a fraud that has been 
repeatedly manipulated and abused by a small number of very powerful 
countries in the North in order to justify wanton military aggression against 
and prolonged military occupation of weak countries of the South.”181 
Obviously, the case of North Korea would fall outside of this geographic 
characterization.  Additionally, North Korea wields the fourth largest military 
in the world.182  The humanitarian crisis within North Korea is very real.  
Thus, Boyle’s concerns would not necessarily apply to intervention into the 
DPRK. 
C. The View of Ian Brownlie 
Ian Brownlie works as a professor at Oxford University.  He stated that 
the international humanitarian intervention doctrine was open to abuse due to 
the fact that only powerful states can undertake police measures of the 
required scale.183  However, the fact that a country is powerful does not 
necessarily mean that the country is abusing its power in a particular instance.  
Power can serve the cause of justice.184  Brownlie does acknowledge that the 
occupation of Syria in 1860 and 1861 was a genuine case that was in need of 
a humanitarian intervention.185  One wonders if he would consider the idea of 
intervention into North Korea as a similarly genuine case. 
D. The View of Michael Akehurst 
Professor Michael Akehurst has studied humanitarian intervention since 
1945, which included the Vietnamese intervention against Cambodia.186  In 
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1979, Vietnam overthrew Cambodia’s Pol Pot regime.187  However, rather 
than claim that they were engaging in a humanitarian intervention, Vietnam 
instead denied that its forces had been in Cambodia at all, and that Pol Pot 
had been overthrown by the Cambodian people.188 
The United Nations Security Council held a debate in January 1979 to 
discuss the actions Vietnam took in Cambodia and whether it was legally 
justified under the International Humanitarian Intervention doctrine.189  Many 
states thought that Vietnam acted illegally by entering the sovereign state of 
Cambodia and interfering in their internal affairs.190  Professor Akehurst 
observed that, “Several of these states mentioned the Pol Pot regime’s 
appalling violations of human rights, but nevertheless said that those 
violations did not entitle Vietnam to overthrow the regime.  Not a single state 
spoke in favor of the existence of a right of humanitarian intervention.”191  He 
stated: 
From this brief survey of state practice, it will be seen that the concept of 
humanitarian intervention has been invoked by states on a surprisingly small 
number of occasions since 1945, and on each occasion, humanitarian intervention 
has been condemned as illegal by other states. Moreover, the United Nations 
debates on Cambodia in 1979 provide some evidence that there is now a consensus 
among states in favor of treating humanitarian intervention as illegal.192 
Recent currents of thought since 1979 allow more room for IHI and R2P, 
which came about later than the Cambodia debate of 1979.  The Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), a hybrid tribunal, has brought 
court action for the Khmer Rouge violations in Cambodia from 1975–1979.193  
States may be opposed to IHI for their own self-interested reasons, such as 
fear that the injustices that they perpetrate may someday be subject to 
intervention under IHI.194  If Vietnam had stepped in for genuine 
humanitarian reasons under the auspices of the UNSC, there could have been 
very different views even at that time. 
E. The View of Hedley Bull 
Hedley Bull served as a former professor of international relations at 
Oxford University.  Professor Bull noticed that the “developments in 
international law in recent decades, especially in the field of human rights, 
might . . . provide a wide mandate for legitimate forms of outside 
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involvement in what was previously considered the sphere of jurisdiction of 
states.”195  Nonetheless, Professor Bull did oppose unilateral humanitarian 
intervention as follows: 
We have a rule of non-intervention because unilateral intervention threatens the 
harmony and concord of the society of sovereign states.  If, however, an 
intervention itself expresses the collective will of the society of states, it may be 
carried out without bringing that harmony and concord into jeopardy.196 
Bull thus notes the increased range of involvement even as he retains a more 
collective view of intervention. 
The original UNSC Resolution condemning North Korea’s aggression 
and authorizing a U.S.-led UN coalition to repel that aggression likely still 
remains in force, although it was enacted in 1950.197  If it is still deemed to 
remain in force, then Bull’s criterion for collective action has arguably 
already been fulfilled.  As such, the full range of IHI and R2P could remain 
viable, subject to the prudential judgments of the parties.  This legal state of 
affairs can enter into robust diplomacy with North Korea, China, and Russia, 
even as it strengthens the hand of South Korea, the U.S. and Japan—to name 
the six parties formerly engaged in the Six Party Talks.198  Back channels for 
diplomacy, such as the UN channel in New York and the Swedish Embassy 
of North Korea, have been used recently as well, as the Secretary of State has 
indicated publicly.199 
F. The View of Sean D. Murphy 
Professor Murphy wrote a book on humanitarian intervention during his 
time working as an attorney for the United States Department of State.200  He 
argued against unilateral humanitarian intervention in this volume: “In 
conclusion, unilateral humanitarian intervention finds little support in the 
rules of the UN Charter and in state practice in the post Charter era.”201  
Professor Murphy examined the military intervention that took place in 
countries such as Liberia, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia, Rwanda, 
and Haiti after the Cold War and asserted: “Recent events show a striking 
willingness of states to forego unilateral humanitarian intervention in favor 
of Security Council authorization, thereby reinforcing the views of those that 
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regard unilateral humanitarian intervention as unlawful.”202  Professor 
Murphy asseverates that throughout recent history, member states have opted 
not to pursue unilateral intervention.  Member states tend to favor using the 
Security Council. 
The recent string of UNSC resolutions against North Korea have used 
Article 41 for increasingly stringent yet non-forcible intervention purposes.  
These resolutions have authorized the interdictment of North Korean vessels, 
forbidden North Korea’s export of seafood, and have deemed over ninety 
percent of North Korea’s exports to be contraband.203 
If the UNSC were to authorize a full-blown blockade of North Korea, it 
could be considered an act of war.204  Up to this point, the UNSC resolutions 
have slowly moved in that direction, though it has not quite reached it yet. 
Article 42 does explicitly mention blockades as an option though. 
The U.S. had taken a “maximum pressure” policy in the midst of 
resolutions not only by the UNSC, but also the European Union and 
individual countries such as South Korea, Australia, and Japan.205  The 
aggregate of actions by other countries has a collective impact when taken 
together.  Should this aggregate of actions have an impact on the analysis? 
G. The Sum of the Views of Highly Qualified Scholars 
The bulk of the highly qualified scholars reviewed here opine that 
unilateral humanitarian intervention should not be permitted under current 
international law.206  Additional scholars including Philip C. Jessup,207 Louis 
Henkin,208 Noam Chomsky,209 and Oscar Schachter210 have also written 
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against unilateral humanitarian intervention, considering it a violation of 
international law.  Even the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, 
and Change did not recognize unilateral humanitarian intervention as lawful 
in its 2004 report.211 
However, my interlocutor in this Symposium, Professor Jens David 
Ohlin, together with his co-author Professor George P. Fletcher, present a 
persuasive case for legitimate defense, which allows for defense of others in 
instances where self-defense by that nation is permitted.  This doctrine 
receives attention in the next section. 
V. Legitimate Defense 
Even if the doctrines of IHI and R2P fail, the doctrine of legitimate 
defense waits in the wings.  Due to the UN Charter’s multi-lingual history, 
the doctrine is grounded in the French translation of the UN Charter Article 
51—which is no less official than the English version.212  Ohlin and Fletcher 
uncover the history of légitime defense during the negotiation of the UN 
Charter.213  They also trace this Continental idea from its roots prior to the 
UN Charter.  They find that “[t]he concept supports a much broader range of 
permissible interventions, not just limited to individual self-defense or mutual 
defense arrangements.  Any nation has the right to intervene when nations 
fall victim to illegal aggression.”214 
A rigorous, nuanced and far-ranging book such as “Defending 
Humanity” cannot be adequately summarized and applied in such a small 
space.  Thus, this section is merely a brief treatment of its doctrine of 
legitimate defense and ways it may apply to countries attacked or imminently 
threatened to be attacked by North Korea. 
Ohlin and Fletcher discuss six elements of legitimate defense: (1) the 
attack must be overt; (2) the attack must be unlawful; (3) the attack must be 
imminent; (4) the defense must be necessary; (5) the defense must 
proportionate; (6) the defense must be an intentional or knowing response.215  
North Korea has recently threatened unlawful and overt attacks around 
Guam, over the Pacific with a nuclear weapon (which the ICJ deems illegal) 
and upon U.S. cities, such as Washington D.C.216  These threats carry 
timeframes and are threatened retaliation to actions that North Korea does not 
like.217  North Korea has made these threats while carrying out ballistic 
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missile and ICBM tests, demonstrating that these weapons can reach cities in 
North America.218 
Theoretically, if legitimate defense is recognized, then any nation should 
be able to take necessary and appropriate defensive actions against known 
attacks, including nations that are not the target.219  For example, if North 
Korea launched a missile at Japan that defensive calculations confirmed 
would hit Japan, then that missile may be lawfully destroyed under legitimate 
defense by not only Japan, but any other defending country.220  If South 
Korea, for example, opted to destroy the missile headed towards Japan, it 
could do so under legitimate defense. 
One important element to consider is imminence: at what point is an 
attack considered imminent?  In the above example, imminence would surely 
cover the entire time the missile is in flight.  Would it cover the pre-launch 
phase?  Defensive cyber-electronic warfare could cause the missile to 
explode, misfire or go awry prior to an attempted launch.221  Given that even 
test launches have been forbidden by the UNSC resolutions, interfering in the 
pre-launch phase with a launch determined to be aimed to hit another country 
could fall within imminence. 
Earlier points in time can cause more debate.  Was the Israeli air force 
justified in bombing the Syrian nuclear facility?  Does persistent hostility 
make a difference?  Do ongoing aggressive goals change the analysis?  North 
Korea has had the goal of taking over South Korea by force throughout its 
history.222  It has repeatedly threatened South Korea, Japan and the United 
States.223  For example, North Korea has threatened to turn Seoul into a “sea 
of fire” many times.224  What is the earliest point at which imminence is 
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triggered? 
Ohlin and Fletcher asseverate that legitimate defense is inherent.  As 
such, the UNSC need not pass a resolution to enable legitimate defense.  This 
aspect of legitimate defense would dispose of the objections in the previous 
section about unilateral intervention.  It allows for unilateral intervention by 
any and all nations that meet the elements enunciated—whether even 
members of the UN or not.225  Thus, Australia could defend South Korea, 
Japan and/or the United States under legitimate defense if the elements are 
satisfied.  For that matter, so could China. 
VI. Contemplating Intervention in North Korea 
The major concerns associated with North Korea are its military threats 
and its gross, systematic human right violations.  The United Nations and 
many Member States want to solve the security and human rights crises 
within North Korea, but at the same time, they do not want to see massive 
bloodshed and the possibility of sparking World War III.226  An ideal solution 
is the peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula. 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program was first announced by the 
United States on October 16, 2002, and tensions on the Korean Peninsula 
have perhaps reached their highest levels after the signing of the Armistice.227  
North Korea itself went on to announce this development in the same month 
in 2002.228  Since then, multiple countries (United States, China, Japan, South 
Korea, and Russia) all convened with North Korea to move towards a 
peaceful use of nuclear energy by which North Korea would in-turn receive 
political and economic support in order to promote mutual trust, stability and 
peace on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.229  However, every 
negotiation with North Korea through the beginning of 2017 has failed to 
resolve the dual human rights and security crises. 
Along with nuclear weapons, North Korea possesses chemical and 
biological weapon technology that they could unleash in an invasion.230  The 
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United States Department of Defense noted that, “North Korea probably has 
had a longstanding chemical weapons program with the capability to produce 
nerve, blister, blood, and choking agents and likely possesses a chemical 
weapons stockpile.  North Korea probably could employ chemical weapon 
agents by modifying a variety of conventional munitions, including artillery 
and ballistic missiles.”231 
This report further states, “North Korea continues to research bacterial 
and viral biological agents that could support an offensive biological weapons 
program. Infrastructure, combined with its weapons industry, gives North 
Korea a potentially robust biological warfare capability.”232  Packaging 
chemical and biological warfare with the nuclear program that they continue 
to make more powerful and farther ranging sobers contemplation of forcible 
intervention. 
Not only does North Korea have nuclear, chemical, and biological 
warfare means, but it also has a massive military—the fourth largest on the 
planet in number of units.233  However, the units are typically not on the 
cutting edge of military technology.  For examples, North Korea still has old 
Soviet MiGs and tanks.234  The North Korean government claims that the 
DPRK suffers from the worst famine in its history—so much so, that even 
members of the military, who are prioritized over civilians, do not have 
enough to eat.235 
Less visible, but still dangerous, is North Korea’s cyber war tactics.  
North Korea, through cyberattacks, has stolen over 80 million dollars from a 
bank in Bangladesh, one of the poorest countries in the world.236  It also stole 
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over 40 million dollars from a Taiwanese bank, but almost all the money was 
recovered.237  The international banking system appropriately has cut North 
Korea off from its SWIFT code system.238  More ominously, however, North 
Korea has hacked into South Korean computers to steal military operation 
plans.239  The U.S. recently promoted its cyber operations into its own 
separate command. 
The three largest militaries on Earth—the U.S., Russia, and China—have 
prepared forces and are engaged in military exercises around Korea more than 
ever.240  Japan and South Korea have also joined in military exercises with 
the U.S., even as they procure more high technology equipment from the 
U.S.241  Multi-valent missile defense systems that can potentially target a 
missile at every stage, is in ongoing development.242  There have been 
successful tests even recently, but the state of the science keeps improving. 
Many South Koreans, even more so among younger and middle-aged 
generations, do not believe they should make a huge sacrifice for the North 
Korean citizens and do not view North Korea as a huge threat to their 
country.243  Furthermore, these polls have shown that South Koreans dislike 
Japan almost as much as North Korea, and believe that the United States 
might provoke a war with North Korea.244  South Korea is willing to wait for 
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the North to change on its own.  South Koreans envision the two Koreas 
growing slowly together in the future.245  However, the Korean War 
generations favor a more assertive approach.246  President Moon of South 
Korea has moved in a more realistic and pragmatic direction, and has sought 
to project a unified front with the United States and Japan, even as he pokes 
at issues with Japan, and runs ahead prematurely with a new version of the 
Sunshine policy that some call “Moonshine”.247 
As large as North Korea’s military is, it should not be overestimated.  It 
is true that North Korea has many conventional howitzers on railroad tracks 
that retract into the mountains on their side of the border.248  Those guns are 
aimed at and can easily fire into Seoul and hide from pre-emptive attack.249  
However, new military technologies, such as laser defenses and high velocity 
projectiles may be able to defend Seoul much better than before.250  Seoul is 
about thirty-five miles from the Korean border.251  Reportedly, North Korean 
artillery would fail to reach the southern side of Seoul and has questionable 
accuracy.252  If worst comes to worst, the subway system of Seoul provides a 
strong shelter to North Korean attacks in the event that the populace is not 
evacuated elsewhere.253 
South Korea should prepare the best possible defenses, whether against 
cyberattacks, missiles, artillery, or any other type of attack from North Korea.  
The military aspects can also have a direct impact on diplomatic efforts, 
which may yet succeed in bringing about the peaceful reunification of the 
Koreas.  If China, the U.S., Russia, South Korea, and Japan all agree that they 
will bring about the reunification of North and South, could Kim Jong-Un 
withstand a determination along these lines?  China and Russia have thus far 
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not demonstrated a willingness to move in this direction. 
Reunification could bring many benefits to all parties involved.  Already, 
South Korea’s trade with China doubles what it trades with the United States, 
and far exceeds China’s trade with North Korea.254  Reunification could also 
ease tensions enough to expand the Trans-Siberian railroad, allowing it to run 
down the whole Korean peninsula as part of a web throughout the region, 
accelerating and facilitating the movement of people and goods.255 The two 
Koreas reportedly are conducting surveys in this direction. Furthermore, the 
companies in a reunified Korea could much more efficiently and productively 
extract the more extensive natural resources in the North.  The building of 
infrastructure in the North would multiply returns economically.  In this 
scholar’s estimation, it would be more than worthwhile for the U.S. to scale 
down its military assets from a unified Korea if China insists upon it, which 
seems likely.  The U.S., unless it plans a land invasion of China, would 
theoretically not need military assets in Korea after North Korea is subsumed 
in the new Korea, except as a deterrent to China.  The U.S. has the Seventh 
Wing and Seventh Fleet in the Pacific as well as major bases in Japan.256  The 
U.S. also has rapid mobilization abilities and long-range strike capabilities.257  
If this concession is necessary to win China’s cooperation to reunify the 
peninsula, it could be well worth it.  However, the psychological impact on 
South Korea could favor a phased diminution over a complete withdrawal. 
Also, an implosion within North Korea is distinctly possible.  Anti-
regime graffiti, completely illegal in North Korea, has emerged at record 
levels.258  Kim Jong-Un’s reign of terror leaves no one secure—not even his 
half-brother, uncle, nephew or his Army Chief-of-Staff, whom he executed 
with anti-aircraft fire.259  As economic and diplomatic pressure rises, the 
regime may implode, the Kim Dynasty may end, and reunification would 
ideally follow quickly on its heels.   
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VII. Ideas and Applications 
One type of limited forcible intervention would be a decapitation strike 
that would attack the top military leadership of the country.  This type of 
military action might involve Special Forces acting in unison as rapidly and 
effectively as possible.260  This action would cut the head off the figurative 
snake by striking Kim Jong-Un and North Korea’s top leadership, as well as 
quickly taking control of all weapons and command structures within North 
Korea, and then unifying the Koreas. 
Does any military in the world have Special Forces able to accomplish 
this mission?  There were rumors that the United States had troops touch 
down in North Korea to do reconnaissance.261  Brigadier General Neil Tolley 
was said to be quoted saying: 
U.S. special forces parachute into North Korea in order to spy on Pyongyang’s 
underground military facilities.  The U.S. military cannot see North Korea’s 
extensive tunnel infrastructure, which include 20 partially subterranean airfields, 
thousands of underground artillery positions and at least four tunnels underneath 
the De-Militarized [sic] Zone that separates the two Koreas, so we send [Republic 
of Korea] soldiers and U.S. soldiers to the North to do special reconnaissance.262 
However, after this story was published, the U.S. military aggressively denied 
it and Tolley himself said he was accurately quoted, but he was speaking 
hypothetically about what could be helpful in the future.263  “To be clear,” he 
said, “at no time have we sent special operations forces into North Korea.”264 
Both the United States Special Forces and the South Korean special 
forces brigade train together during the annual springtime exercises for this 
specific scenario.265  Various news reports state that “U.S. Special Forces 
have been training alongside Republic of South Korea Special Forces in mock 
scenarios in which they would be inserted into North Korea.”266  Their 
exclusive mission would be to help launch, grow and lead a partisan 
movement of North Korean citizens that they rescue and free from the 
concentration camps.267 
North Korea has countered all this Special Forces talk by developing and 
 
 260. See Alex Lockie, SEAL Team 6 is Reportedly Training for a Decapitation Strike 
Against North Korea’s Kim Regime, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 14, 2017, 11:35 AM), 
https://nordic.businessinsider.com/seal-team-6-is-reportedly-training-for-a-decapitation-
strike-against-north-koreas-kim-regime-2017-3/ [http://perma.cc/KB29-TLGN]. 
 261. See Isaac Stone Fish, Are There U.S. Special Ops Inside North Korea?, PASSPORT 
(May 30, 2012, 10:03 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/05/30/are-there-u-s-special-
ops-inside-north-korea/ [https://perma.cc/C92S-K24Y]. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. See Anthony C. Lobaido, U.S. Special Forces Train for North Korea Mission, 
WND (Nov. 23, 2014, 8:54 PM), http://www.wnd.com/2014/11/u-s-special-forces-train-
for-north-korea-mission/ [https://perma.cc/8EPM-DVC6]. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
TAN FORMATTED (6-15-18) 3/7/2019  10:53 AM 
38 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 51 
establishing their own special forces.268  The North Korea Special Operations 
forces, according to North Korea, are “[a]mong the most highly trained, well-
equipped, best fed and highly motivated forces in North Korean leader Kim 
Jong-Un’s military.”269 
Such a limited forcible intervention would work legally because North 
Korea has continued to perpetuate the Korean conflict through disavowal of 
the Armistice as well as hostilities and belligerent behavior, which have 
perpetuated a state of war, which allows attacks on military targets.270  A 
strike on military personnel during war is considered a war-time operation, 
and is legal, as opposed to a civilian assassination, which is illegal.271  Quickly 
and overwhelmingly taking over the command and control structure of North 
Korea and reuniting it with South Korea could prevent escalation. 
The Korean War began in 1950 as a result of North Korean forces 
invading South Korea by crossing the 38th parallel in an attempt to forcefully 
take over the entire Korean peninsula. Only after years of bloodshed and 
negotiations did the North Korean forces, backed by China, and the U.S.-led 
coalition on behalf of the United Nations and South Korea, come to an 
Armistice Agreement that effectively created a cease-fire between the two 
sides.272  However, because no permanent peace treaty ever came into 
fruition, and because North Korea has repeatedly violated the terms of the 
Armistice Agreement by their actions and their words, there has not been a 
formalized end to the Korean War.273 
The Korean Armistice Agreement (“Agreement”) is one of the longest, 
most violated military armistices in modern history.  North Korea, or the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has repeatedly, by its words 
and its actions, violated the provisions of the Agreement.  The Agreement 
required that its provisions apply to all ground, naval, and air forces on both 
sides of the Demilitarized Zone, a two-and-a-half-mile area that separates 
North and South Korea.274  Additionally, commanders on each side are to 
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insure complete compliance with these provisions by “adequately punishing” 
all subordinates who violate the provisions of the Agreement.275  Each side of 
this conflict was also required to actively cooperate with one another and with 
the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory 
Commission in order to ensure the spirit of the provisions of the Armistice 
Agreement were being met.276  No such cooperation has transpired from 
North Korea. 
Additionally, the Agreement prohibits any acts of war, or hostile acts 
within, from, or against the Demilitarized Zone.277  North Korea has violated 
the Agreement by continuing its nuclear program, its missile and nuclear 
tests, and its constant threats against the United States, as well as its allies.278  
North Korea has repeatedly, purposely, and systematically engaged in various 
acts of war, as well as acts of hostility within the ironically named 
demilitarized zone—the most militarized border on planet earth. 
Recently, the DPRK has announced that it would no longer adhere to the 
Agreement, as it considers the Agreement to be void.279  Such an 
announcement is prohibited by the Agreement, which states that the 
Agreement shall remain in effect until it is superseded by mutually acceptable 
amendments and additions or by a peaceful settlement that is agreed to by 
both sides of the conflict.280  On its face, a unilateral withdrawal breaks the 
terms of the Agreement, which can only be “undone” by a supersession or 
peace treaty (not by a unilateral declaration “voiding” the Agreement). 
Scholars generally agree that traditionally an armistice agreement does 
not end the condition of war between the parties: it is merely a way for both 
parties at war to mutually suspend military operations for a fixed period of 
time.281  Additionally, Article 36 of the Hague Convention expressly states 
“[a]n armistice suspends military operations by mutual agreement between 
the belligerent parties.  If its duration is not fixed, the belligerent parties can 
resume operations at any time, provided always the enemy is warned within 
the time agreed upon, in accordance with the terms of the armistice.”282  The 
Korean Armistice Agreement does not contain a provision for recommencing 
hostilities because of a serious and intentional breach of the Agreement; 
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however, the Hague Convention does permit a belligerent party to denounce 
a serious violation of an armistice agreement by another party and 
recommence hostilities immediately in urgent situations.283  The DPRK’s 
continuous violations, including their refusal to cease their nuclear 
proliferation activity, threats and testing, could easily be considered an 
immediate and urgent situation to the United States and its allies.  After the 
1st Trump-Kim Summit though, the DPRK has reportedly ceased the bulk of 
their threats and testing. 
Although North Korea has shown their contempt for the Armistice 
Agreement through their words and actions, neither a new full-blown war, 
nor a true peace treaty has emerged to supersede the Agreement only 
additional agreements and concessions have been signed.  North 
Korea has repeatedly violated all subsequent agreements as well by 
their continuous hostile actions, nuclear proliferation activity, and 
their ongoing threats.284  The legal significance of North Korea’s contempt 
for the Armistice Agreement is that an international armed conflict still exists, 
the legal state of war continues, and under the Hague Convention guidelines, 
the United States could legally recommence hostilities towards North Korea 
at any time.285 
Even if such a limited forcible intervention is never attempted, the 
possibility in the background can enable more progress on the diplomatic 
front.  Only strong, robust diplomacy has a chance to prevail.  The prior 
attempts at diplomacy were all too weak to make actual headway.  They did 
not interrupt the cycle of saber-rattling brinkmanship, but instead rewarded 
it.  Ideally, the current military buildup and options in the background will 
not lead to World War III, but resolutions of the human rights and security 
crises by bolstering the diplomatic efforts by impacting the parties’ views of 
their respective interests. 
The more recent robust diplomacy has interrupted the cycle of 
brinkmanship.  North Korea’s threat to encircle Guam in a ring of fire 
received a very strong response.286  North Korea backed off.287  North Korea 
threatened to shoot down U.S. planes in international airspace.288  Not long 
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after it issued this threat, U.S. planes zoomed past North Korea in 
international airspace, successfully calling North Korea’s bluff and 
diminishing its already scant credibility.289  The DPRK has recently talked 
about achieving an equilibrium of force with the U.S., a weaker sort of 
posture than they have usually communicated.290 The question is whether 
technical reasons predominate or if the strong stance of the U.S. has deterred 
further tests during this time. 
Former Secretary of Defense Mattis has made public statements 
indicating that though the U.S. would rather not have to do so, it has many 
ways to annihilate North Korea.291  North Korea has threatened to detonate a 
nuclear weapon over the Pacific, potentially launching an Electromagnetic 
Pulse (EMP) attack, which could devastate Hawaii or Guam.292  The U.S. in 
turn has expressed its determination to defend its territory and people, as well 
as to protect its allies like South Korea and Japan.293 
Ignoring the gross human rights problem within North Korea will not 
cause their evaporation and living at the mercy of a merciless regime will 
only further devastate the North Korean people.  North Korea’s missiles 
already can hit parts of the United States, if not all of it.  The world, 
galvanized by North Korea’s trampling of its own people as well as the 
proliferation and direct threats that North Korea poses, should arise to defuse 
these crises before they wax worse. 
China, which has accounted for some ninety percent of trade with North 
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Korea, holds more cards to impact the DPRK than any other country.294  
China does not agree with how North Korea conducts itself, but China has a 
few other reasons to keep North Korea around.295  China has long opposed 
the collapse of a fellow Communist regime.296  Another reason is that China 
dreads the prospect of a powerful pro-Western Korea that would share 
borders with them.297  Yet another reason is the stream of Korean refugees 
seen as taxing the resources Beijing has for the citizens of the less 
economically prosperous northeastern region of China, which shares almost 
all of North Korea’s northern border.298  China has invested much into the 
DPRK, most of which would be more accurately considered aid rather than 
trade.  North Korea reportedly has multiple trillions of dollars’ worth of rare 
earth minerals, and is wealthier in natural resources than South Korea.299 
At the same time, the relationship between China and North Korea has 
fallen to a low point.  North Korea has publicly denounced and threatened 
China, which explains why even China sets up anti-missile batteries along 
their shared border against North Korea’s launches of missiles.300  China has 
cut off North Korean access to its banking and financial system, and  has shut 
down North Korean businesses in China.301  China expelled North Korean 
laborers.302  China pledged to implement the UNSC Resolutions against North 
Korea starting from September 5, 2017.303  China, as its views on its own 
interests has been shifting, has taken more action to pressure North Korea 
than it ever have done.  More recently though, China has backed away from 
implementing the UN sanctions even as it has called for easing of these 
sanctions. 
Assassinations and assassination attempts have driven a further wedge 
between China and North Korea.  Kim Jong-Un executed his uncle Jang 
Song-Thaek, who had been prepared to serve as something of a regent to the 
new Supreme Leader.304  The accusations, which underwent no due process, 
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included factionalism, corruption and dissolute behavior.305  Jang Song-
Thaek ruled as the country’s second most powerful man and a brother-in-law 
connection to the previous Kim’s power in North Korea.306  Adam Cathcart, 
an expert on North Korea, said accusations of factionalism and seeking power 
were pro forma in such cases, but Jang’s execution is unheard of because 
family members are normally dealt with more compassion and typically 
retained within the borders of North Korea.307  Cathcart went on to say the 
drama, speed, and improvisation on display made this “somewhat 
alarming.”308  Further, Patrick Ventrell, a spokesman for the National Security 
Council, said, “[i]f confirmed [as this act later was], this is another example 
of the extreme brutality of the regime.”309  China considered Jang Song-Thaek 
to be its most important tie with North Korea.310  As such, his assassination 
has caused a serious rift in the relationship between Beijing and 
Pyongyang.311 
But Kim Jong-Un has gone after other members of his family besides his 
uncle.  His eldest half-brother, Kim Jong-Nam—who was reportedly a 
possible replacement that China would have preferred—was “gruesomely” 
assassinated with a nerve agent in February of 2017. 312  China also very 
recently prevented the assassination of Kim Jong-Nam’s son, Kim Jong-Un’s 
nephew.313  To put it mildly, none of these assassinations or attempted 
assassinations endear North Korea to China.  Most recently as of this writing, 
North Korea has threatened to eliminate President Donald Trump for his 
“blasphemy” against Kim Jong-Un.314 
The U.S., which holds more cards to impact China than any other 
country, has been playing its cards with China more than ever, including 
through tariffs and rebukes about the theft of U.S. intellectual property.  The 
U.S. has implemented more secondary sanctions against Chinese individuals 
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and entities violating the sanctions placed against North Korea.315  More can 
follow and if additional entities and individuals continue breaking the 
sanctions against North Korea, more should follow.  The U.S. has been 
playing four dimensional chess with China, utilizing an array of vectors. 
Furthermore, China exports more to the U.S. than to any other individual 
country’s market by far.316  China also holds more U.S. debt than any other 
foreign holder of U.S. debt.317  The U.S. has threatened to take further action 
on intellectual property issues, which China views very differently from the 
U.S.318  The U.S. government has also claimed that China has manipulated its 
currency to bolster its exports.319  Also, China has a much larger trading 
relationship with South Korea, dwarfing its trade with North Korea.320  China 
further objects to the defense systems that the U.S. has been providing to 
South Korea and Japan because of how it shifts the power configuration in 
the region.321  All of these issues have been realigning China’s views of its 
own interests, fueling greater motivation for China to take actions to pressure 
North Korea, the declared number one priority of the U.S. government. 
Notably, China has publicly declared that it would not defend North 
Korea if it attacks first.322  This is the first time that China has made such a 
statement, and it is quite significant because after all, it was the Chinese forces 
that prevented the UN Coalition from winning the Korean War. 
As the current U.S. president took the longest foreign trip by any U.S. 
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president in a score of years during November of 2017, he chose to do so to 
Asia with North Korea as the top agenda item.323  A parade of prominent U.S. 
officials, including the Vice-President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of 
Defense have made strategic journeys to northeast Asia with a focus on 
resolving the North Korean crises.324  President Trump reported after the trip 
that South Korea will join the U.S. in its sanctions, that Japan fully supports 
the U.S. approach, other Asian states will cut off North Korea economically, 
and that China has been urged to exercise its economic influence over North 
Korea.325 
When North Korea sent college student Otto Warmbier back home in a 
coma, many Americans were shocked at the brutality of the regime.  
Warmbier, who suffered severe head trauma, died not long after returning.326  
Several Americans, including two faculty members at the Pyongyang 
University of Science and Technology, have been returned by North Korea 
as a result of the 1st Trump-Kim Summit.327  The recently retired U.S. Special 
Envoy for North Korean Policy, Joseph Yun, reportedly had sought to 
negotiate their release.328  Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korean 
agents still cause outrage in Japan.329  All considered, North Korea has too 
many crimes such as these and others on its hands. 
China has more recently refused to implement the UNSC sanctions to 
the extent it did before.  Russia has been violating the sanctions regime 
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through the port of Vladivostok, including in its fuel shipments.330  Secondary 
sanctions have begun against a number of Russian entities and individuals,331 
but they may need to increase dramatically before Russia actually implements 
President Putin’s promise to implement the UNSC Resolutions.  Russia 
forgave some ninety percent of North Korea’s debt in 2012, and Putin has 
generally acted as a cheerleader for the Kim Dynasty.332 
Militarily, China and Russia have conducted joint naval exercises nearer 
to the Korean peninsula than ever before.333  China has amassed a large 
number of soldiers along its border with North Korea.334  Russian jets with 
nuclear payload capabilities have zoomed near Korea.335  The four largest 
militaries in the world have amassed military might and technology as never 
before seen around Korea.336  At the same time, China frequently reiterates 
its desire for peace and stability in the region, and rebukes North Korea’s 
destabilizing provocations.337 
The U.S. has stationed three Super-Nimitz class aircraft carrier strike 
groups around the Korean peninsula.338  China only has two such aircraft 
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carriers in its entire fleet.339  Nuclear submarines, state-of-the-art fighter jets 
and other major military assets have been drilling in and around Korea 
together with the Japanese self-defense forces and the South Korean 
military.340  Congress  passed the largest military budget in U.S. history for 
2018.341 
At the same time, U.S. citizens have not been evacuated to date.  The 
North Korean military has not shifted into an imminent attack posture yet.  
These signs point against full-scale hostilities resuming immediately, 
contrary to the hysteria of certain media sources. 
With this tension between China and North Korea, as well as the further 
missile testing launches by North Korea, the United States has moved to push 
multiple pieces of legislation that seek to punish North Korea.342  For 
instance, on January 12, 2016, lawmakers voted on the North Korea Sanctions 
Enforcement Act, which proposed to deny North Korea the hard currency 
they say it needs for its weapons program.343  This passed out of the House of 
Representatives, later it passed the Senate, and President Obama signed it into 
law.344 
A panel on North Korea said existing United Nations sanctions against 
the reclusive country have been seriously under-enforced.345  But as 
mentioned above, this may be changing: China has been heavily involved in 
the passage of the last four major UN Security Council Resolutions against 
the DPRK, and has attempted to actually enforce these resolutions for a 
limited span of time at least.  China also holds approximately 50,000–200,000 
North Korean refugees or more.346 
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China, in accordance with their obligations under the Refugee 
Convention,347 must not repatriate North Korean refugees into the DPRK.  
Since North Korea labels leaving the country as criminal treason, the refugees 
who are returned to North Korea typically face torture, time in concentration 
camps, or even execution.348  Thus, even if one accepts the Chinese 
government’s categorizing these refugees as “economic migrants,”349 they 
still, at a minimum, qualify as refugees sur place because of what awaits them 
upon return to North Korea.350 
The UNSC has passed an array of resolutions against North Korea over 
the past quarter century.  The main points of these can be summarized in the 
following way: (1) they seek to block munitions and military know-how from 
entering or proliferating from the DPRK; (2) they call for a ban on luxury 
items entering the DPRK; (3) they do nothing to impede legitimate 
humanitarian, medical, safety, judicial and diplomatic efforts; and (4) they 
call on the DPRK to abide by its already existing treaty obligations and to 
return to diplomacy. 
The United Nations Security Council passed at least four major 
resolutions from 2016 to 2017.351  In March of 2016, the council unanimously 
voted to severely toughen its penalties against the isolated country in 
Resolution 2270.352  The closer cooperation between the United States and 
China on this resolution was noteworthy.353  The fifteen member Council 
approved the resolution, which was negotiated for weeks by American and 
Chinese officials, which requires inspection of all cargo going in and out of 
North Korea.354  The sanctions further called for “banning all weapons trade 
and expanded the list of individuals facing sanctions.”355  Many diplomats 
said that this resolution was one of the most stringent efforts yet to 
“undermine North Korea’s ability to raise money and secure technology for 
its nuclear weapons program.”356  The American Ambassador to the United 
Nations said the resolution was “comprehensive, robust and unyielding.”357 
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Additionally, two weeks before the resolution was passed, President 
Obama signed the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 
2016 into law.358  The statute and resolution work together to enhance and 
toughen sanctions against the North Korean government.  They both call for 
CVID, the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear 
weapons programs.359  The statute also incorporated Resolution 2270 by 
definition.360 
Resolution 2270 builds upon but then extends further than the prior 
resolutions in a number of ways: (1) warning of North Korea’s use of shell 
companies; (2) restricting the use of gold as a means of sidestepping the 
resolutions; (3) including human rights concerns of the people in using 
language such as the “ humanitarian concerns of the international 
community,” “Expressing deep concern at the grave hardship that the DPRK 
people are subjected to” and “while DPRK citizens have great unmet needs,” 
thus joining human rights concerns with security ones for the first time; (4) 
adding specific individuals and entities that were not included before as 
sanction targets; (5) including small arms and light arms in extending existing 
sanctions to all arms; (6) making inspection mandatory for both incoming and 
outgoing vessels; (7) calling for the closing of offices relating to DPRK 
commerce and for not engaging in business with the DPRK and its entities; 
(8) expelling individuals in violation of these measures; (9) prohibiting 
specialized teaching usable for illicit military purposes; (10) forbidding 
Member states from providing vessels for use by the DPRK; (11) banning 
flights that violate purposes of these resolutions; (12) specifically banning 
biological and chemical weapons; (13) prohibiting the sale of coal, iron, iron 
ore, vanadium ore, titanium ore, gold, and rare earth minerals (which the 
DPRK reportedly has over multiple trillions of U.S. dollars’ worth); (14) 
forbidding the sale of aviation fuel, including aviation gasoline, naptha-type 
jet fuel, kerosene-type jet fuel, and kerosene-type rocket fuel to the DPRK; 
(15) making the DPRK asset freeze comprehensive; (16) forbidding banking 
with DPRK banks, opening new branches in the DPRK, and calls for closing 
bank branches in the DPRK; (17) forbidding trade that could support the 
nuclear or ballistic missile programs of the DPRK; (18) reinforcing the 
importance of state reporting related to these resolutions.361 
As for the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, 
it explicitly references the DPRK’s willful violations of multiple UNSC 
resolutions.  The rest of the Act gives the government power to act towards 
North Korea, while also attempting to advance the human rights situation.  
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Some of the highlights include sections 202, 301–304, and 403.  Section 202 
calls for measures to increase the percentage of countries submitting reports 
on implementation of sanctions pursuant to UNSC resolutions 1718, 1874 
and 2094, and in particular notes the critical role of China to enforce the 
UNSC resolutions.362  Section 301 requires a classified report from the 
President that contains a detailed plan for making unmonitored mass 
communications available to the North Korean people.363  Section 302 
requires the Secretary of State to raise international awareness of the human 
rights situation in North Korea through a report as well as sustained outreach 
to other governments, media outlets and NGOs.364  Section 303 mandates a 
report from the Secretary of State on North Korea’s concentration camps.365  
Section 304 demands another report from the Secretary of State regarding 
gross human rights violations and censorship in North Korea—even naming 
specific governmental entities in North Korea such as the prominent National 
Defense Commission.366  Section 403 authorizes $10,000,000 per annum in 
funding from 2017–2021 to carry out the sanctions.367  When I spoke at the 
State Department in January of 2017, one of the people working there told 
me that the State Department considers the use of these funds to be merely 
precatory—suggestions that the State Department could implement or not at 
its discretion.  If it has not done so yet, I urge the State Department to employ 
these funds to increase the flow of helpful information to the North Korean 
people. 
As noted in section 202, enforcement and reporting on past resolutions 
have been major problems.  The Security Council has been trying to secure 
much greater cooperation from member states along these lines.  Progress has 
already been made, but much more progress can yet come.  Kudos to China, 
then, for stepping up enforcement, at least ostensibly not long after passage 
of recent resolutions, as its role remains pivotal in this regard.  Beijing 
publicly opposes Pyongyang’s development of a nuclear weapons arsenal, 
and reprimanded the North on March 2, 2016, for carrying out nuclear and 
rocket tests in 2016 in “defiance” of international prohibitions.368  China 
further signaled that it believed the sanctions in resolution 2270 would soon 
spur peace talks.369 However, satellite imagery has caught Chinese and 
Russian vessels transporting fuel to North Korea, which has stabilized fuel 
prices and supplies. 
The second resolution of 2016, UNSC Resolution 2321, addresses the 
growing threat of the DPRK and how the DPRK generates revenue through 
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prohibited arms sales, which are diverted to pursue the development of 
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, while DPRK citizens attempt to 
subsist in starvation conditions.370 
Resolution 2321 places secondary sanctions on specific individuals 
listed in Annex I.371  The sanctions also prohibit Member States from allowing 
DPRK nationals to practice commercial or professional activities for personal 
profit,372 limiting bank accounts to DPRK nationals, and limiting the use of 
real estate by DPRK nationals.  The UNSC seeks to stop DPRK nationals 
from providing financial support for nuclear and missile programs for the 
DPRK.373  The prohibitions also expand to metals and supplies that can be 
used to manufacture weapons, such as copper, nickel, silver, and zinc.374  The 
sanctions also allow for Member States to confiscate and dispose of any of 
the prohibited items that they find on board DPRK vessels and aircraft.375  The 
sanctions also call for the expulsion of an individual working for or on behalf 
of a DPRK bank or financial institution from their territories for the purpose 
of repatriation to the individual’s state, consistent with international law.376 
This round of sanctions on the DPRK limits the movement of DPRK 
nationals and government officials outside of the DPRK.  The sanctions also 
try to limit the resources coming out of the DPRK and limits the resources 
going back in.  This is meant to stifle the DPRK’s financial gain as a way of 
cutting off their funding of illegal weapons.377  As stated earlier, the UNSC’s 
chief concern was over the DPRK’s testing of illegal weapons and use of its 
revenue towards nuclear and missile programs instead of providing for its 
citizens. 
Notwithstanding the second resolution towards the end of 2016, China 
increased its year-over-year trade with North Korea during the first three 
quarters of 2017, citing a desire to avoid destabilizing its neighbor.378  Three 
Chinese coal companies have imported over half a billion dollars’ worth of 
coal between 2013 and 2016.379  At the same time, 2017 has seen the largest 
seizure of North Korean ammunition to date.380 
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The United Nations Security Council then passed two major resolutions 
imposing further sanctions on North Korea in August and September of 2017, 
following ICBM tests by the DPRK.381  The UNSC once again called for the 
DPRK to uphold the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 
noting that the DPRK should look to support the needs of their people instead 
of supporting weapon construction.382  The UNSC also noted that the DPRK 
should be willing to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through 
dialogue with member states, particularly those involved in the Six Party 
Talks.383  In line with the general pattern, the UNSC’s sanctions on the DPRK 
moved in a much more stringent direction even in the short span from August 
to September. 
At the Security Council’s 8019th meeting on August 5, 2017, the Security 
Council, inter alia, sought: (1) to get the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK) to respond to the international community’s security and 
humanitarian concerns; (2) to reiterate that none of the measures by this 
resolution were meant to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the 
civilian population of the DPRK; and (3) to address the DPRK’s July 3 and 
July 28 ICBM tests, which violated the Security Council’s current 
resolutions, and which challenges the NPT’s goal to “strengthen the global 
regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the danger they pose to 
peace and stability in the region and beyond,” because other nations may 
decide to obtain and/or construct their own nuclear weapons, emboldened by 
the DPRK’s tests.384  The Security Council “condemns in the strongest of 
terms” the DPRK’s ballistic missile tests during the month of July.  The 
Security Council then ordered the DPRK not to conduct any more tests of its 
missiles, and that it must abandon any other existing weapons of mass 
destruction and ballistic missile programs in a “complete, verifiable, and 
irreversible manner.”385 
This resolution declares sanctions on the DPRK’s coal, iron, iron ore, 
lead, and lead ore exports.386  The UNSC also decided that the DPRK shall 
not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its 
nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, seafood, unless the Member State 
had a pre-existing contract with the DPRK prior to the resolution taking 
effect.  If that is the case, then the Member State can continue to do business 
with the DPRK only up to thirty days after the resolution takes effect.387 
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The UNSC seeks thereby to restrict the amount of funds that the DPRK 
has to spend on its ballistic missile and nuclear programs.  The sanctions 
apply to dual-use (both civilian and military) items, a pretext that China used 
in the past to ship contraband to North Korea. 
The September 2017 sanctions increased in intensity in response to yet 
another ballistic missile test by the DPRK on September 2, 2017 in violation 
of its prior resolutions.388  Resolution 2375 prohibits or limits the sale and 
transfer of natural gas liquids, refined petroleum products, crude oil, and 
textiles from the DPRK.389  The resolution notes that while the DPRK funds 
its weapons programs, many women and children go with unmet needs, and 
are malnourished.390 
The September resolution allows for joint ventures to continue for 120 
days after the resolution, but only on a case-by-case basis with approval from 
the UNSC.391  The UNSC also allows Member States to stop and inspect 
vessels identified as DPRK vessels on the high seas, and to bring them into 
port to conduct the inspection if the vessel refuses.392  The resolution also 
allows for Member States to seize and dispose of any items prohibited by the 
UNSC, or items that can be used for any type of weapon prohibited under the 
NPT.393 
South Korea, Japan, and the European Union have also passed multiple 
sanctions against North Korea.  South Korea passed their unilateral sanctions 
on March 16, 2016, a few days after the United Nations.394  Lee Seok-jun, 
minister of the government policy coordination office, claimed that the South 
Korean government “will continue to sanction and press the North in close 
cooperation with the international community so as to create conditions 
where there is nothing for it but to change.”395  These sanctions require foreign 
ships that have visited North Korea in the previous 180 days be banned from 
entering South Korean waters.396  This in essence forces countries to decide 
whether to trade with South Korea or North Korea.  Japan passed a very 
similar sanction one month prior.397 
The European Union passed sanctions in line with the United Nations on 
April 1.398  EU Foreign Policy Chief Federica Mogherini said they were still 
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considering additional EU-only sanctions on top of the UN measure and 
officials said some preparatory work had started on this task already.399  These 
sanctions include additional export and import bans on any goods that could 
benefit North Korea’s military, a requirement that member states inspect all 
cargo to and from North Korea, and a ban on flights and port calls carrying 
prohibited items.400  The EU will further ban exports from North Korea of 
coal, iron, gold and aviation fuel.401  Furthermore, the EU placed financial 
sanctions on North Korea, including freezing the assets of government 
entities associated with the country’s nuclear or ballistic missile programs, 
and closing branches, subsidiaries and representative offices of North Korean 
banks.402 
Most of the EU sanctions follow the UN sanctions.  The EU sanctions 
additionally ban: (1) provision of new DPRK banknotes and coins; (2) 
diamonds; (3) new commitments for grants and loans to the DPRK; (4) 
restrictions on issuance of and trade in certain bonds; (5) obtaining certain 
ores and minerals from North Korea; (6) restrictions regarding certain flights 
involving EU airports and on overflight.403 
Additionally, many means exist to deliver knowledge directly to the 
citizens of North Korea.  DVD players and even computers are now becoming 
more and more common within North Korea.404  Tunable radios are being 
smuggled into the country more regularly now as well.405  Savvy 
organizations have sent materials via balloons.406  Even though there are laws 
against breaking the seals on radios that keep them fixed on the government 
station, more and more citizens are taking the risk.  This allows the general 
public, as well as the elite of North Korea, to hear truthful messages to break 
the propagandistic illusions of the Kim regime. 
The United Nations should follow South Korea’s (and to a lesser extent, 
the United States’)407 example in providing information to North Koreans.  It 
is possible to broadcast messages receivable on one of the five non-state-run 
radio stations that North Korea have available.408  More DVDs, leaflets, 
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thumb drives, etc. specifically tailored to North Korea audiences can give 
truthful messages about their country and the outside world.409  Additionally, 
these materials can incorporate anonymous (to prevent harm to their family 
and friends) narratives of North Korean refugees, including what they 
experienced inside North Korea, how they escaped, and the better life they 
now have.410  These messages can both foster a movement towards 
reunification, even as it prepares them for the reunification to come. 
The concept of hostis humani generis, and what it means to be an “enemy 
of all mankind” or “enemy of all humanity” should be applied to the 
leadership of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), especially 
to the Supreme Ruler Kim Jong-Un.411  This term comes out of piracy law.412  
Cicero first defined pirates as hostis humani generis, and of nearly equal 
importance were the attendant laws furnished by Cicero and the Roman 
Senate which first construed piracy not as a mere action against individuals, 
but against the nation as a whole.413  Some have made the argument that the 
same concept should be applied to terrorists, as terrorists do not necessarily 
operate under the flag of a recognizable sovereign state, but rather under their 
own organization, which lies outside of any sovereign state, and is therefore 
not protected under any national body of law, and thus subject to universal 
jurisdiction.414  Just like the pirate, the terrorist’s activity is also not directed 
only against individuals, but against the nations to which the citizens 
belong.415  Kim Jong-Un has been individually singled out for U.S. sanctions, 
and some say he qualifies as a terrorist.  That includes the U.S. Department 
of State which recently re-added North Korea to the list of State Sponsors of 
Terrorism.416 
The Second Circuit case Filártiga v. Peña-Irala applied the term hostis 
humani generis to a person who tortures another.417  In that case, Peña-Irala, 
who was the inspector general of police in Asuncion, Paraguay, kidnapped 
the seventeen-year-old son of Dr. Filártiga, who had openly denounced the 
government of Paraguay.418  Peña-Irala tortured Dr. Filártiga’s son, Joelito, 
who subsequently died from his injuries.  Peña-Irala then brought Dr. 
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Filártiga’s daughter, Dolly Filártiga, to his house to view her brother’s body, 
where she noticed all of his bruises.  Dr. Filártiga brought suit in Paraguay 
for his son’s death, where Hugo Duarte, a member of Peña-Irala’s household, 
testified that Peña-Irala did not kill Joelito, but that Duarte killed Joelito in a 
crime of passion after catching Joelito and Duarte’s wife in flagrante delicto.  
Even though three different autopsy reports corroborated the allegation of 
torture, the court still ruled in favor of Peña-Irala, but then refused to arrest 
Duarte for the murder.419  Dr. Filártiga decided not to continue to pursue the 
matter in Paraguay’s courts as he thought it would be futile.420 
After the trial in Paraguary, Peña-Irala emigrated to the United States 
under a visa where he lived even after his visa expired.  Peña-Irala resided in 
New York.  Years later, Dolly Filártiga also emigrated to the United States 
under a visa, and resided in Washington, D.C.421  Upon learning that Peña-
Irala lived in the U.S. as well, Dolly brought suit against him for the wrongful 
death of Joelito under wrongful death statutes, the UN Charter, the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, the UN Declaration Against Torture, the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and other pertinent 
declarations, documents and practices constituting the customary 
international law of human rights and the law of nations, as well as 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1350, Article II, sec. 2, and the Supremacy Clause of the U. S. Constitution.  
Jurisdiction was claimed under the general federal question provision, 28 
U.S.C. § 1331, and, principally on this appeal, under the Alien Tort Statute.422  
The court found that under applicable laws, the United States had jurisdiction 
to hear cases alleging torture in other countries by non-citizens under the 
authority of universally accepted norms of the international law of human 
rights, as long as the person accused of torture is properly served within the 
borders of the United States.423  The opinion finished by stating that for the 
purposes of civil liability, “the torturer has become like the pirate and slave 
trader before him hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”424With 
this, a federal appellate court applied the term hostis humani generis to 
someone who engages in acts of torture.  Also, the Filártiga court dismissed 
the appellee’s “Act of the State” defense, in which the appellee asserted that 
the act of torture was an act of his government, and not his own act.425  
Therefore, appellee asserted that he only acted as a tool putting into motion 
the will of his government, and that he did not act on his own accord, and 
therefore the liability fell upon his government, and not himself.  As stated, 
the court did not allow the appellee to take refuge under this defense and held 
him liable for his personal involvement with the torture.  The court applied 
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this term of admiralty law to government officials who engage in acts of 
torture.  However, the term is applied narrowly to only include those 
government officials that personally engage in acts of torture, and not to 
government officials and/or leaders who give the order to torture a person. 
The United States enacted the Torture Victim’s Protection Act of 1991, 
which further classifies torture as an international crime and a “crime against 
humanity,”426  This Act, following the Filártiga case, defines the scope of the 
authority that the United States has as far as jurisdiction over, and the ability 
to enforce claims of torture by citizens and non-citizens in other countries.427  
Again, this act limits claims to include only those against people who 
personally engaged in the torture.  It should be noted that this act creates 
universal civil jurisdiction over torturers, even though the international 
community has agreed that only criminal jurisdiction should be allowed.428 
In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos brings a closer analogue to Kim Jong-
Un.429  In this case, families of victims of torture, summary executions, and 
unexplained disappearance brought suit against the former President of the 
Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos.430  The allegations against the former 
President (torture, executions, etc.) were based upon the actions of his 
military during a period when Marcos had declared martial law, and Marcos 
himself had not personally participated in the actions except to give the 
order.431  The estate appealed on the grounds of the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (FSIA).432  The lower court dismissed all lawsuits against the 
former president under the “Act of State” doctrine; however, the Court of 
Appeals reversed and reinstated the claims.433  The court held that: (1) the 
FSIA did not apply to former President’s acts of torture, execution, and 
disappearance; (2) the District Court had jurisdiction under the Alien Tort 
Statute; (3) the families’ stated cause of action was based on violating the law 
of nations; (4) claims did not abate upon the former President’s death; and (5) 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting a temporary 
injunction, although the case sought only money damages.434 
The Marcos case demonstrates how a court can hold a former President 
of another government responsible for his actions under the Alien Tort 
Statute.435  Although civil, this case asserts that the FSIA does not protect a 
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former leader from his acts of torture and summary executions, especially 
when acting outside the scope of his presidency.436  The Marcos case shows 
that even though the former President did not personally engage in the torture, 
executions, and disappearances of his people, the fact that he declared martial 
law and gave the orders to others to do the initial acts triggered liability for 
the injuries and deaths of the victims. 
This case provides legal justification for labeling Kim Jong-Un hostis 
humani generis.  Marcos holds a former government leader accountable for 
giving orders to subordinates to carry out human rights violations, akin to the 
violations that Kim Jong-Un orders his subordinates to carry out against his 
people, his family members, and foreigners like Otto Warmbier.  Thus, the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, on the basis of this case, does not apply 
to Kim Jong-Un.  Marcos extends the Filártiga decision that a torturer is a 
hostis humani generis, by extending liability to those who order torture.  Kim 
Jong-Un has ordered more and worse than Marcos—not to mention the threat 
he poses to the region and the world.  Hence, he qualifies as hostis humani 
generis, or “enemy of all humanity.” 
Conclusion 
North Korea has the worst human rights crisis in terms of the breadth 
and extent of its violations, and also presents the most serious security crisis 
in the world.  A trio of doctrines—International Humanitarian Intervention, 
the Responsibility to Protect, and legitimate defense—provide the foundation 
for a range of solutions and approaches to resolve this crisis.  At the same 
time, North Korea poses real dangers, the situation is delicate, and the 
resolutions may prove difficult.  Strong determination is necessary to stay the 
course until the Koreas reunite, ideally in a peaceful manner.  The situation 
has moved rapidly over the past couple of years, and seems to be headed 
towards a climax of one kind or another.  Hope remains on the Korean 
peninsula that the gross and systematic human rights violations in North 
Korea will finally be put to rest, and that the North Korean people will be able 
to live in a just peace, no longer a menace to the region and the world. 
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